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Theory and practice of monetary policy have changed significantly over the
past three decades. A very important part of today’s monetary policy is
management of the expectations of private market participants. Publishing
and justifying the central bank’s best forecast of inflation, output, and the
instrument rate is argued to be the most effective way to manage those
expectations.
1 I would like to thank Alan Blinder, Friedrich Kißmer, and Lars Svensson for valuable
comments, Daniel Schulz for his excellent research support, and Rolf Knütter and Eva Matanovic
for their efficient help in searching for literature and in improving/layouting the text.
1_2007  30/5/07  1:37  Stránka 3The author works out the foundations of this new consensus view, compares
the communication policies of the Federal Reserve, the ECB and the Bank of
England, and discusses possible “limits to transparency”. He argues that
“model uncertainty” has led several central banks to apply simultaneously
prognoses based on several alternative models. Special attention is drawn to
the optimal degree of openness concerning central bank ignorance and the
possible implications for the institution’s image of competence.
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1 Introduction
Theory and practice of monetary policy have changed significantly over the
past three decades. Not only have hypotheses (consensus views) on monetary
policy and its effectiveness changed but also monetary policy institutions
have considerably been modified over this period of time. 
On the theoretical side, one of the main driving forces has been the change in
focus on information and information asymmetries. This is reflected in what
is called the ‘revolution’through the theory of ‘rational expectations’that was
introduced in the 1970s and brought with it a fundamental shock to the
previously accepted opinion on the effects of monetary policy. It postulated
the ineffectiveness (neutrality) of monetary policy. However, from the
beginning, this ‘ineffectiveness theory’ was regarded as extremely doubtful
by many observers. To substantiate it, questionable assumptions on the status
of information of economic subjects had to be taken as a basis. The main
criticism, outlined already in the 70s and 80s, of this ineffectiveness theory
can be summarized in the following two points: it is based (i) on a lack of
a (or an inadequate) micro basis of the theory, and (ii) on an unsatisfactory
consideration of uncertainty. In the next two chapters of this Study, I want to
concern myself with whether/how far the theory of monetary policy has since
eliminated/taken these alleged weak/critical points into account. I will first
show that since then in monetary theory both a more comprehensive micro
basis has been supplied and more account has been taken of uncertainty (and
learning processes), but the fundamental information assumptions are still
very strict. 
On the practical side, monetary policy institutions have been modified, too,
over the past decades. In particular, central banks have become more
independent, more transparent, and are more governed by committees today.
In chapter 4, I shall mainly concern myself with information or
communication policy, in particular the challenges of central bank
communication, under uncertainty. Although the ineffectiveness hypothesis
has lost much of its appeal over the last decades, the conventional view
nowadays regarding optimal monetary policy has changed paradigmatically
from the conviction that monetary policy decisions should take the market by
surprise towards the view that central banks should announce their monetary
policy decisions in a timely manner and with transparency. Consequently,
many central banks have modified their communication policies recently.
1_2007  30/5/07  1:37  Stránka 7This field has been researched on intensively over the last two decades and
led not only to changes in theoretical thinking on monetary policy but also to
various changes in institutional design (and communication) as well as
strategy of central banks, and, moreover, to specific challenges to central
bank communication. I shall survey these institutional changes and the
challenges for central bank communication, and discuss their theoretical
foundations in this chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes.
8 Introduction
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The micro basis of macroeconomics, which has advanced successively in the
last two decades, has also found acceptance in the theory of monetary policy.
The 1990sin particular saw adevelopment that culminated in what is described
today as the “new neoclassical synthesis” (NNS) (Goodfriend and King,
(1997), Rotemberg and Woodford, (1997)).
2 This unites important elements
of “new classical macroeconomics” (NCM), in particular from the “real
business cycle” (RBC) theory, with other elements of “new Keynesian
macroeconomics” (NKM) models of the 1980s(for the latter see, e.g., Mankiw
and Romer (Eds.), (1991)). Like the first, or “old”, neoclassical synthesis from
Hicks, Samuelson and Patinkin, the new approach attempts to bridge the
methodological division into microeconomics and macroeconomics by using
the tools of the general equilibrium theory to model Keynesian insights. The
NNS stringently realises the demand of the NCM from Lucas and Sargent, who
required the use of intertemporal general equilibrium analysis (intertemporal
optimizing and rational expectation analysis) to model the complete dynamics
of the economy. In so far, their methodology conforms largely to that of the
RBC literature. The difference is solely that wage and price rigidities are now
permitted as well, but determinants of the (individually) optimal wage and
price setting decisions are modelled explicitly. In this way, central elements of
the NKM, namely imperfect competition and dynamic wage and price
rigidities, are taken over.
In the NNS, delays in wage and price adjustment explain temporary
deviations from the potential output, whose development is determined
largely by factors that are stressed in the RBC theory. In contrast to monetarist
and neoclassical models, which allocated cyclical swings above all to erratic
monetary policy actions, in the NNS models real disturbances play a central
part as the actual source of short-term output changes.
What differentiates the NNS from the NCM (and from the RBC theory as
well) is that cyclical swings are no longer to be regarded as desirable (in the
sense of a necessary adjustment of supply and demand on the individual
markets), and (!) monetary policy is no longer irrelevant or ineffective either.
The ineffectiveness theory that has been criticized in the 80s and 90s is no
longer supported by the NNS (at least not in the short to medium term).
9
2 For an overview about the NNS see Goodfriend (2004).
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distortions that would otherwise occur with real shocks because of imperfect
wage and price adjustments.
3 In so far, the NNS shares important aspects with
Keynesian theory: the emphasis on market failure in the short term after
economic shocks, and the role of wage and price inflexibilities as a source of
such market failures. The NNS also contains the return to the application of
the methods of optimal control (in a modified form), to calculate optimal
stabilizing policies. These common features are also a reason why other
authors prefer the term “new Keynesian models” for this type of model
instead of “NNS” (Gali, (2002)).
4 However, the assertion is somewhat hasty
that the NNS has laid the foundation stone for overcoming the separation
between microeconomics and macroeconomics. For example, Michael
Woodford, one of the architects of the NNS, writes: “In principle, the grounds
for reunification (...) seem to be largely in place. Macroeconomics no longer
claims that the study of aggregate phenomena requires a distinct
methodology; instead, modern macroeconomic models are intertemporal
general equilibrium models, derived from the same foundations of optimizing
behaviour on the part of households and firms as are employed in other
branches of economics. Furthermore, the aims of stabilization policy can now
be discussed in terms – namely, the attempt to mitigate quantifiable efficiency
losses resulting from identifiable distortions of the market mechanism – that
correspond to those used for policy evaluation by microeconomists”
(Woodford, (1999), p. 31). It should be noted that the type of micro basis that
has asserted itself in the NNS represents only a specific type of micro basis
that is exposed to the same criticism as the traditional general equilibrium
theory. This concerns in particular the inherent information assumptions and
the inadequate consideration of uncertainty. 
In so far, the NNS is also subjected to the earlier fundamental objection to the
NCM (see above in the Introduction) that it starts from the basis of
questionable assumptions on the state of information of economic subjects.
10 Micro basis of the theory of monetary policy
3 For example, former NCM (RBC) economists such as Goodfriend and King now confess that
“aggregate demand must be managed by monetary policy in order to deliver efficient
macroeconomics outcomes” (Goodfriend and King, (1997), pp. 255–6). In the NNS approach,
active monetary policy takes effect essentially through the mark-up mechanism. Because of the
assumption of rigid prices, not all companies can adjust their prices, and therefore their mark-up,
after a shock. In the event of a shock, monetary policy should react so that companies do not have
any incentives to alter prices later. Demand shocks must therefore be accommodated in full and
productivity shocks accommodated perfectly (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, (1999)). Standard
calibrations lead here to surprisingly large values for output fluctuations, which can be initiated
through money supply shocks (cf. e.g. Gali, (2002)).
4 Another frequently used term is “new consensus model” (Goodfriend, (2005)).
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NNS excludes “involuntary unemployment” in the sense of the
non-employment (exclusion) of part of the population. In the NNS model all
employees are equally employed, even though the hours worked can be less
than the social optimum. In this way, essential welfare costs of empirical
(full-time) unemployment are not taken into account. This itself is sufficient
reason for many “genuine” Keynesians to question the label “neo-Keynesian”. 
Post-Keynesians also criticise the fundamental new IS curve (see equation
(2.2) below), and also reject the concept of a vertical Phillips curve. They
point here, among others, to empirical studies that show that the interest
elasticity of the investment is non-linear and asymmetrical (Taylor, (1999)),
and the impact lags of monetary policy are long and variable (on the
post-Keynesian criticism of the NNS see, e.g. Lavoie and Seccareccia (Eds.),
(2004), and Kriesler and Lavoie, (2005)).
However, even mainstream macroeconomists such as Larry Ball criticise the
new consensus model as “flawed” (Ball, (2005), p. 263) and “wildly
counterfactual”
5 (p. 265). “In any case, the model’s absurd predictions make
it a poor tool for policy analysis. (...) In most cases, the output-inflation
trade-off still has the wrong sign. The only thing that works is adding lagged
inflation to the Phillips curve. But the New Synthesis model does not justify
this term. Adding it is equivalent to ignoring the model and going back to the
accelerationist Phillips curve” (op. cit.). While some neo-Keynesians such as
Mankiw and Blanchard regard the transition from the IS-LM model to the
RBC models as a smooth evolutionary process, and for this reason regard the
term “new synthesis” as an exaggeration
6 other economists have fundamental
doubts. For example, DeVroey ((2004), p. 86) writes: “...the perfectly
competitive and imperfectly competitive models must be viewed as rooted in
incompatible trade technologies, the Walrasian and the Marshallian.
Therefore a merger between them is hard to envisage. The picture that then
emerges is rather one of two rival macroeconomic paradigms, a Marshallian
(i.e., imperfect competition) and a Walrasian (i.e., perfect competition),
existing side by side.”
The supply side of the NNS model is based on the foundations of the NKM,
in that mainly monopolistic competition on the goods market and price
Micro basis of the theory of monetary policy 11
5 See Mankiw (2001) as well on this.
6 Blanchard claims that practically all macroeconomists have always recognized the relevance
of the three components of the NNS (intertemporal optimization, nominal rigidities and imperfect
competition), but with different weightings (Blanchard, (1997), p. 290).
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7. One, widely-used, way to introduce sticky
nominal prices is a Calvo-style Phillips curve.
8 Here, only a certain
percentage of the randomly selected companies acting in the market can reset
prices in each period (Calvo pricing); the empirically observed price
movements are to be mapped in this way. Each company sets its price in such
a way that the discounted sum of the deviations between optimal and existing
prices in future periods is minimized. This results in a dependency of present
prices on future prices and, through the companies’mark-up, a dependency of
production on price changes. These considerations then lead to the new
Phillips curve
(2.1) πt = βEtπt+1+ γ(yt – y ¯t) + εt,
where πt and yt denote inflation and output, y ¯t describes the natural production
level (at time t), and Et stands for the expectations parameter. This Phillips
curve, along with the described dependencies, also contains a demand shock
εt, which is generally defined in detail as a stationary random variable with
expected value zero. β and γ are exogenous and positive constants here.
The demand side of the NNS model contains above all considerations of the
RBC theory; the consumption, money and leisure demand can be derived
from households’ optimization calculation. An IS curve with the shape 
(2.2) yt = Etyt+1– a1(rt – r ¯)
is usually derived here, whereby consumption depends on the real interest. r ¯i s
the interest at which production lies at the natural level, a1 is a positive
constant. 
In the New Keynesian approach to monetary policy, this is supplemented by
a model of the transmission mechanism that should describe the relations
between the central-bank’s variables of interest (including inflation and
output gap, for instance) and its instrument (be it a short-term interest rate or
(a component of) the monetary base). How the instrument is determined then
depends on the nature of the monetary-policy regime, which could be
12 Micro basis of the theory of monetary policy
7 In rare cases alternative wage inflexibilities on the labour market are assumed.
8 Another way that gives rise to effectively sticky prices and/or wages, is based on the sticky
expectations approach of Mankiw and Reis (2002), where otherwise rational and forward-looking
agents receive information with some delay. 
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a supplement.
9 The LM curve
,
with Rt as the nominal interest in period t, is here to be characterized as
positive in the context of the NNS, because, in this approach, monetary policy
is supposed to almost never be carried out through money supply control but
through an interest rate regulation (such as, e.g., the Taylor rules)
(2.3) rt = r ¯ + c1πt + c2 (yt – y ¯t).
b1, b2, c1, c2 are exogenous and positive constants here. The money supply is
set by the central bank so that the real interest rate is set according to its rule
through households’ demand for money. The solutions of the endogenous
variables y, p, r, π, R can be calculated with the four equations, because the
equation that determines the nominal interest rate is integrated in the LM
curve. 
In this approach, stability effects of the monetary policy are measured by
a loss function that can be understood in certain circumstances as the
approximation of a welfare function. 
The NNS confirms that the former critics of the ineffectiveness theory were
right. However, ad hoc approaches of the NCM theory had already shown at
the beginning of the 1980s that slight changes in the assumptions regarding
the information level in the NCM approaches led to monetary policy rules not
being ineffective, in spite of rational expectations and price flexibility
(Canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff, (1983)). According to this, it is not all the
same which rules monetary politicians follow. Modern approaches confirm
that different rules lead to different welfare effects. The problem here is not
the ineffectiveness of monetary policy rules but the enforceability of optimal
policy rules. In addition, game theory approaches show that monetary policy
is not dependent on whether it is rule-based (committed) or discretionary.
Discretionary policies produce an inflation bias and/or stabilization bias. 
Micro basis of the theory of monetary policy 13
9 It should be made clear that an instrument rule such as the Taylor rule is not inherent in the
New Keynesian approach to monetary policy. Using such an instrument rule can even be regarded
as a theoretical weakness, as thereby an arbitrary restriction on the set of policy rules is made. For
a critique on the use of Taylor rules, see Svensson (2003).
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developed. The (previous) micro basis itself is only partial or incomplete. The
standard approaches of the NNS, for example, do not contain a logical
substantiation of money holding. That is, the benefit of money is not
established adequately. In addition, the standard approaches, as described
above, take into account so-called Calvo pricings. However, a convincing
micro basis for the delayed price adjustments is missing (cf. e.g. Hall in the
discussion on Goodfriend and King, (1997), p. 294). For example, we can ask
ourselves why it should be more expensive to change prices than employment.
And the empirical evidence for the statements of the NNS have been mixed up
to now and do not support the new theory in general (see above). The core of
the criticism is: the pricing function in the NNS is empirically very
controversial. Apart from this, some also criticise the lack of substantiation for
the claim of a long-term vertical Phillips curve. Both lead to uncertainties
regarding the adequate supply equation.
More knowledge of the specific rigidities that exist empirically is required,
because individual NNS model results are sensitive towards the exact
character of the rigidities. If the rigidities are sector-specific, this rules out (as
Canzoneri et al., (2002) emphasise) perfect stabilization of the aggregated
output through re-active monetary policy, because a single monetary policy
measure cannot fit all sectors. 
This leads in the end as well to an increase in the influence of international
policy coordination of the monetary policy, if the producers set prices in their
local currency. In older Keynesian models the influence of international
coordination is very restricted, in the more modern ones examples can at least
be found that make this coordination obvious (see, e.g., Berger and Wagner,
(2006)).
The problems that are only hinted at here indicate that the micro basis of the
NNS (still) leaves something to be desired and its results entail great
uncertainties. 
14 Micro basis of the theory of monetary policy
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A second critical point that was referred to from the beginning was the
insufficient consideration of uncertainty and learning in the theory of
monetary policy. As a whole, it holds true for the modern theory of monetary
policy that a broad consensus appears to exist today with regard to the
normative target of a central bank (minimizing inflation volatility and the
volatility of the gap between output and the equilibrium output level with
flexible prices). There is less consensus with regard to the best strategies for
achieving this target. It holds true for the greater part of this modern research
that it still largely ignores information imperfections and uncertainty. “The
central bank is assumed to know the true model of the economy and to
observe all relevant variables accurately. The sources and properties of
economic shocks are also taken to be known. Uncertainty arises only due to
the unknown future realizations of these shocks. 
In practice, [however], policy choices are made in the face of tremendous
uncertainty about the true structure of economy, the impact policy actions
have on the economy, and even about the current state of the economy.”
(Walsh, (2004), p. 2)
10
However, there has recently been a whole series of research work on the role
of uncertainty in monetary policy, and we will be discussing this briefly
below. A difference can be made here between research work on uncertainty
in the central bank policy and on uncertainty in the formation of private
expectations.
3.1 Uncertainty in the central bank policy
In the modern theory of central bank policy three types of uncertainty above
all are perceived and analysed. These are (a) uncertainty regarding the
economic situation (e.g., most economic and financial data are only available
after a time lag and are subject to revision after their initial publication); (b)
15
10 Walsh himself is one of the leading representatives of the modern theory of monetary policy
and author of what is currently perhaps the most famous text book on “Monetary Theory and
Policy” (2
nd ed., (2003a)), which is found in advanced study and PhD programmes all over the
world.
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economy (because of model uncertainty and of parameter uncertainty, which
describes the uncertainty regarding the strength of the structural relationships
in the framework of a specific model); (c) strategic uncertainty (that concerns
the interplay between central banks and private individuals and in particular
the role of expectations that can have a decisive effect on monetary policy
transmission). The uncertainty factors, with which central banks are
confronted, are not only varied but are also interdependent.
11
The question now arises regarding the consequences that monetary policy
decision makers should draw from the different forms of uncertainty.
Research on this is relatively young, although it has exploded recently,
triggered above all by cross-border crises and increased (perceived)
uncertainty in the course of the consequences of globalization and European
integration since the mid-1990s/the end of the 1990s.
12 However, it can be
seen here that the political implications of this research are very sensitive as
against the different assumptions regarding uncertainty.
In particular, the debate on model uncertainty, and there on the robustness of
monetary policy, has been in the focus of research recently. For this reason,
this point is to be considered in some more detail below.
3.1.1  Bayesian approaches of model uncertainty
Model uncertainty means that a decision maker does not have complete
confidence in his model. The existence of model uncertainty is not actually
a new discovery. Even Milton Friedman pointed out repeatedly in the
1960s that there are impact lags of monetary policy (and of fiscal policy) that
are long and variable (uncertain). This implies, as he argued, that the
prognosis capability of politicians is restricted, with the consequence that an
active (activist) policy can destabilize the economy, instead of stabilizing it as
planned. 
In the mid-1990s, Bennet McCallum and others went on from
Friedman’s point of view when they initiated a research programme that was
to evaluate the robustness of monetary policy rules over a set of alternative
models. McCallum stressed ((1997), p. 355): “I have favored a research
strategy centering around a rule’s robustness, in the following sense: Because
16 Inclusion of uncertainty
11 ECB (2001).
12 cf. on this, e.g. Wagner (2001).
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specification of a structural macroeconomic model, it seems likely to be more
fruitful to strive to design a policy rule that works reasonably well in a variety
of plausible quantitative models, rather than to derive a rule that is optimal in
any one particular model.” Most central banks now agree with the view that
they should not rely on prognoses that are based on a single model only. On
the contrary, each forecast calculation should be compared with prognoses
that are based on alternative models, and with information that was acquired
through different processes. The monetary policy is to be enabled in this way
to supply similar results with a large number of alternative models. 
However, one problem here is the, in the end, unavoidable arbitrariness in the
selection of the observed/compared/integrated models and the methods
(processes) used, and the retroactive effect of the model selection on the target
function. A discussion is taking place in the current literature that the target
function is endogenous with regard to the model selection. This means that
the target function that is suitable for one model cannot be used directly to
appraise and compare the results in another model. Put another way,
uncertainty on structural parameters also implies uncertainty on the correct
loss function (Walsh, (2005)).
13 This was not taken sufficiently into account
in the many robustness studies in the recent past.
14
In addition, the question arises whether specific probabilities of events can be
assigned to the individual alternative models. If not, we now have the second
variant of research on model uncertainty and robustness of central bank
policy, namely the theory of robust control.
3.1.2  Approaches of robust control
The theory of robust control differs from the classical control theory in that it
assumes that decision makers are uncertain about their model. Users of the
techniques of robust control in monetary theory are concerned to draw up an
optimal monetary policy that is robust in the sense that it protects the
economy from the worst conceivable consequences if the monetary policy
decision maker’s model is based on a faulty specification. They assume that
the monetary policy decision maker’s problem is so complex that
probabilities of an event occurring can no longer be assigned to the
conceivable scenarios (models). Model uncertainty is then linked with the
existence of a series of non-specified alternatives for a specific reference
Inclusion of uncertainty 17
13 See Woodford (2003) as well here.
14 For recent attempts see e.g. Levin et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2005).
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of the economy. Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, as the currently most
prominent proponents of the theory of robust control in macroeconomics,
refer here to Milton Friedman, who, as they write, “expressed an enduring
concern when he recommended that designers of macroeconomic policy rules
acknowledge model uncertainty. His style of analysis revealed that he meant
a kind of model uncertainty that could not be formalized in terms of objective
or subjective probability distributions over models” (Hansen and Sargent,
(2003), p. 582).
This approach usually shows that in these cases of extreme uncertainty
waiting to see cannot be expedient and that the monetary policy should be
selected that avoids the worst conceivable development path (the so-called
“worst case”).
15Apolicy of this nature can be understood as insurance against
this case. 
While McCallum and his comrades-in-arms take a small number of special
models, of which some at least are rational expectation models, and evaluate
the performance of one (!) given rule throughout these models, Thomas
Sargent and his comrades-in-arms proceed as follows. They assume that
political decision makers and private individuals share a model, but regard
this as an approximation model of the true, but unknown, model. However, it
is possible that each group has different preferences regarding the faulty
specification so that to a certain degree heterogeneity is mapped. As with
rational expectations, an equilibrium concept is assumed here “in which the
private sector and the government share the same approximating model of the
stochastic variables shaking the economy. But both types of agent have
doubts about that model in the form of possibly different penumbras of
alternative models that surround the approximating models” (Hansen and
Sargent, (2003), p. 584).
16 They regard this approach as a further development
18 Inclusion of uncertainty
15 “Robust control theory instructs decision makers to investigate the fragility of decision rules
by conducting worst-case analyses. When both types of agent prefer robustness, the approximating
model for each agent must include a description of the robust decision rules of the other type of
agent, and of how they respond to his own actions. Though they share a common approximating
model, because their preferences may differ, the different types of agent may not share the same
worst-case model”. (Hansen and Sargent, (2003), p. 582)
16 It is increasingly recognized here that rational expectation models, which have dominated
macroeconomics for the last three decades, “impute much more knowledge to the agents within
the model ... than is possessed by an econometrician, who faces estimation and inference problems
that the agents in the model have somehow solved” (Sargent, (1993), p. 3, emphasis in the
original). This does not imply that economic subjects are irrational. Instead of this it can be
assumed that “rational expectation formation” implies a “superfluity” of rationality. For example, →
1_2007  30/5/07  1:37  Stránka 18of or alternative to the dominating literature of the “new neoclassical
synthesis”, which does not take account of robustness.
17
Robustness is understood here technically as a Markov perfect
18 equilibrium
of a two-player zero-sum game. The game has only a single value function
and can be transformed with the methods of robust control into a Bellmann
equation in a linear quadratic context and then reformulated into a simpler
Riccati equation in matrix form. On the demarcation between traditional and
robust control theory Hansen and Sargent state (Hansen and Sargent, (2006),
p. 21): “Standard control theory tells a decision maker how to make optimal
decisions when his model is correct. Robust control theory tells him how to
make good decisions when his model only approximates the correct one.”
Here the central bank has a model that, as we have said, in its opinion
represents a reasonable approximation of the true model, but which can be
incorrectly specified. In an environment of this kind an optimal policy aims
at minimizing the worst-case result that can occur.
To illustrate this: let the central bank’s reference model be assumed to be
(3.1) yt+1= Ayt + BUt+ εt+1,
whereas the real (but unknown) model is
(3.2) yt+1= Ayt + BUt+ C(εt+1+ wt+1).
yt consists of the natural state variables and the endogenous variables. The
vector Ut groups the control variables. εt is a normally distributed random
process with expectation value 0 and the identity as variance-covariance
Inclusion of uncertainty 19
Sims (2003) stresses that optimum information processing on the basis of a restricted cognitive
capacity is reflected in processes of expectation formation that are fundamentally different from
those that are imputed in rational expectation models. To take this into account, Simon (1978)
proposed designating Muth’s (1961) concept of expectation formation not as “rational” but as
“model-consistent”. In this context various model studies have found that monetary policies that
are efficient under “rational” expectations come off very badly when knowledge is imperfect (see
e.g. Orphanides and Williams, (2006)).
17 “The equilibrium concept ... will allow us to compute robust Ramsey plans for
macroeconomic models with forward-looking agents, like the ‘new synthesis’ models of Clarida,
Gali, Gertler (1999), King and Wolman (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and others.”
(Hansen and Sargent, (2003), pp. 601–2)
18 A Markov perfect equilibrium leads in every subgame with Markov strategies to a Nash
equilibrium. Markov strategies do not depend on memoryless variables, with the exception of
variables influencing amounts paid out.
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states of y
t and can therefore cover a large set of possible faulty specifications.
A, B and C are well-defined and suitable dimensioned matrices. The
politician regards (3.1) as a good approximation of the true model. In the
robust control approach by Hansen and Sargent the central bank bases its
monetary policy on a distorted model that contains the worst-case process for
wt+1, but then acts as if model uncertainty no longer exists. Afurther overview
of modelling robust control can be found below in the Annex C. 
In a neo-Keynesian model with parameter uncertainty this can mean that the
central bank is pursuing a more aggressive policy,
19 i.e., for example, it
increases the interest rate more severely as a response to inflation than with
a standard optimal commitment policy of an expected utility maximiser
20 (for
more details of this, see e.g. Walsh, (2004)). 
However, there is still another interpretation of robust control, which is
supported by Hansen and Sargent. They argue that a central bank pursues the
same aggressive policy when it takes its approximation (3.1) as the true
model, but maximizes a target function that reflects an additional risk
sensitivity (see Hansen and Sargent, (2006)). Through this more aggressive
policy it attempts to avoid possible future costs that result from the fact that
shocks in the worst-case scenario prove to be more persistent than in the
approximation model. Greater risk sensitivity therefore serves to ensure, as
did the incorrect specification of the model, that the monetary politician takes
measures against persistent shocks.
However, robustness approaches also mean problems. The main problem when
a distorted model is used is that it can be more difficult for a central bank to
communicate the logical foundation of its political actions. And the distinction
between forecasters and decision makers is blurred. The forecast has to include
the decision maker’s preferences when forming his forecast, because they are
also responsible for determining the worst-case result. In this context Svensson
(2000) has objected that the worst-case results are probably low-probability
results. Consequently, a robust policy, seen from a Bayesian aspect, is too
20 Inclusion of uncertainty
19 However, as more recent studies show, this does not necessarily apply. For example,
Leitemo and Söderström (2005) come to the conclusion that an optimal robust policy, at least in
an open economy, can be either more aggressive or more cautious, depending on the source of the
incorrect specification and the type of shock that affects an economy. See Zakovic, Rustem and
Wieland (2005) as well.
20 The latter usually builds on Brainard’s principle (Brainard, (1967)) and favours a cautious
policy with parameter uncertainty.
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21 22 This also means that a robust
policy is sensitive to assumptions on the largest and smallest possible values
that a parameter can have. In addition, Onatski and Williams (2003) made the
point that any progress on model uncertainty requires structural assumptions
about the nature of model uncertainty. However, the robust control literature,
even the refinements of Hansen and Sargent, do not provide sufficient structure
and can, as shown by Onatski and Williams, give quite misleading results.
In contrast, with the last variant of the robustness approach referred to, which
builds on a distorted target function, there is the problem of the selection of
the additional risk sensitivity in the target function. Sims (2001) characterises
such distorted references, in relation to politicians, as “subrational”.
23
3.1.3  A compromise variant
The objection from Sims (2001) to the maxmin approach of the theory of
robust control is basically that the former often implies unreasonable priors
(a priori probability distributions). This criticism has led to a more general
compromise variant being discussed recently as well, which contains as
border cases the Bayesian and the maxmin approach (see Brock, Durlauf and
West, (2004), as well as Kuester and Wieland, (2005)). This compromise
variant is based on the decision-theory foundation of the so-called Ellsberg
paradox by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Wang (1994). See
below in Annex A for more details of this. The compromise variant states:
Let the decision maker maximise the following utility function
(3.3)
whereby (1 – γ) indexes the degree of the desired insurance as against the
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21 “’Robust control’ consists of selecting the policy that results in the best outcome for the
worst possible model” whereby “the assumptions about the feasible set of models are crucial for
the outcome. Robust control has been proposed as a non-Bayesian alternative that utilizes less
prior assumptions about the model. ... Furthermore, if a Bayesian prior probability measure were
to be assigned to the feasible set of models, one might find that the probability assigned to the
models on the boundary are exceedingly small. Thus, highly unlikely models can come to
dominate the outcome of robust control.” (Svensson, (2000), pp. 6–7)
22 However, there are statements from leading central bank practitioners, in particular in the
context of the search for adequate strategic behaviour of monetary policy in an asset price boom,
which stress the relatively heavy weighting of such low probability events in central bank
decisions (see, e.g., Svensson, (2004)).
23 Sims argues that “the criteria for acceptable shortcuts in decision-making by a central bank
should generally be much stricter than those applying to, say, a consumer buying a new washing
machine” (Sims, (2001), p. 51). 
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also described as “ambiguity averse” (Brock et al., (2004)), because the
decision maker places particular weight on the uncertain worst case. If γ = 1,
this corresponds to a maximizing of the expected utility from a Bayesian
perspective. In contrast, with γ = 0 we have the maximum case (analogue to
the minimax on loss minimizing). The preferences can also be understood as
parameters of confidence in their own assessment.
Somewhat more detailed notes on the theoretical background of this
compromise approach can be found in Annex A (see Section 3.2.2 as well).
This compromise variant can also be understood as a “link” between the two
decision theory concepts of “risk” and “uncertainty”.
3.1.4  Risk vs. uncertainty (Knightian uncertainty)
The differentiation between “risk” and “uncertainty” was made by Frank H.
Knight (Knight, (1921)). According to Knight, “risk” is characterized by it
being possible to assign objective probabilities, which are known to the
decision maker, to the different possible states of nature. In contrast,
“uncertainty” for Knight describes a situation in which no probabilities at all
are known. This is also referred to as an “incalculable” risk or ambiguity.
Risk can be incalculable here for two reasons. On the one hand, it can be
impossible to assign different future scenarios to an unambiguous (subjective)
probability distribution. On the other hand, it can be difficult to assign an
unambiguous result to each scenario. Ambiguity is found in both cases. 
Whereas, therefore, the traditional Bayesian approach to the uncertainty
analysis assumes that the central bank estimates the joint probability
distribution over all scenarios/results and then maximizes the expected utility
of its target function, the probability distribution is not even known here.
The starting point here is the theory that the uncertainty case (the case of
Knightian uncertainty) cannot be said to be caused by the risk case through
permitting subjective probabilities. The attempt to transfer uncertainty fully to
risk by means of subjective probabilities (cf. e.g. Savage, (1954)), was shown
by Daniel Ellsberg (1961) to be questionable in an impressive experiment.
Ellsberg shows that persons who are confronted by two uncertainty situations
of basically the same type, which only differ in the fact that one of them has
objective probabilities and the other does not, usually display a clear
preference for the risk situation and shy away from the uncertainty situation.
This behaviour, which is referred to as the “Ellsberg paradox”, leads many
22 Inclusion of uncertainty
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back to probabilities (so-called ambiguity). But Schmeidler (1982/1989) was
the first to succeed in placing the difference between risk and ambiguity on
a solid axiomatic foundation that was on a par with the subjective expected
utility theory. It was only through the axiomatizing of preferences, which he
invented and which leads to the behaviour dealt with by Ellsberg, that the
theoretical solution proposed by Ellsberg was considered (again), e.g. in the
form of the E(llsberg) capacities introduced by Eichberger and Kelsey (1998)
(as an overview, see Spanjers, (1999), Chap. 8 as well). 
Adherents of robust control (Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetov and Williams
(HSTW), (2006)) also take heed of the “maxmin expected utility approach”,
in which the minimum of the expected utility is taken over the set on the
non-excluded probability distributions
24 (Gilboa and Schmeidler, (1989),
Arrow and Hurwicz, (1972)), and that is based on a special case of the
solution proposed (ad hoc) by Ellsberg. HSTW have shown namely that the
set of alternative models that surrounds the approximation model in the robust
control approach, can be seen as the a priori probability distributions
(‘priors’) that turn up in Gilboa and Schmeidler’s maxmin expected utility
theory (1989).
25 However, the essential difference between Hansen and
Sargent’s robust control theory and Gilboa and Schmeidler’s maxmin
expected utility theory is rather that the latter, in a greater deviation from the
theory of rational expectations, deliberately waive the heroic assumption of
a joint approximation model and assume “real” ambiguity.
26
3.1.5  Summary
We have presented three variations of the discussion on model uncertainty in
the theory of central bank policy. The first (Bayesian) variation emphasises
above all the difference between model-specific optimal and average optimal
policies. The robustness of the monetary policy is understood here essentially
as a property of the monetary policy that ensures that in the “average” of
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24 This implies some uncertainty aversion of consumers, through which the maxmim expected
utility approach differs from the Choquet expected utility theory. However, it permits considerably
more different classes of the existing uncertainty.
25 HSTW interpret robust control here in the form of a recursive version of the maxmin
expected utility theory. 
26 Using so-called “Gilboa-Schmeidler preferences” represents only one possibility for
modelling the decision rules with Knight’s uncertainty. Another possibility is based on so-called
“Bewley preferences” (Bewley, (1986)), which do not concentrate on the worst case only. See, e.g.
Cagliarini and Heath (2000), on possible different monetary policy (interest) decision
simplifications. 
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Taylor or McCallum) interpret the results of this research direction in the
sense of an argument for pursuing simple instrument rules in the monetary
policy, while others (cf. Svensson or Woodford) recommend optimal target
rules, in which the monetary policy instrument does not necessarily follow
simple rules. If we take the phenomenon of parameter or model uncertainty
into account, reasons can be found for extending the safety equivalence
principle by a cautionary aspect in accordance with Brainard: with parameter
uncertainty the monetary policy instrument should regulate more cautiously.
Aspecial feature of the second variation (maxmin or robust control) is that for
reasons of monetary policy caution completely different conclusions
regarding the regulating of the use of the instruments can be arrived at. The
robustness of the monetary policy here is a characteristic of the monetary
policy that ensures the ability to defend against the conceivably worst case
scenario as well. Monetary policy caution is therefore just about expressed
through the inclusion of events that are probably completely unlikely but have
a catastrophic effect. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that the
regulating of the monetary policy instrument should take place comparatively
cautiously. On the contrary, taking the most unfavourable developments into
consideration can imply a relatively aggressive monetary policy. The third
variant is a compromise variant of both. Here, it is not yet possible to foresee
the monetary policy implications that will possibly be derived in the future.
However, as our arguments in Section 3.2.2 will show, the effects for the
monetary policy could be drastic.
The discussions surrounding central banks show that the argument regarding
the adequate consideration of uncertainty or robustness in the monetary
policy is not merely an academic dispute. For example, the ECB regards the
following as signs of an adequate monetary policy in an uncertain
environment: that the central bank (a) pursues in most cases a moderate and
reserved monetary policy aligned towards the medium term in the event of
transmission or structural uncertainty, but (b) with data and model uncertainty
pursues a robust monetary policy (which implies that the central bank should
not rely on specific individual indicators or models considered in isolation).
In addition, (c) to reduce the strategic uncertainty in an economy, credibility
with regard to a properly understood target is regarded as a necessary
orientation aid for market expectations. The ECB also understands these signs
as an adequate foundation for the selection of its monetary policy strategy
(see ECB, (2001), Kißmer and Wagner, (2002, 2004a)).
24 Inclusion of uncertainty
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short-term indicators (pillar 1 = economic analysis) for future price outlooks
are combined with longer-term indicators (pillar 2 = monetary analysis). The
ECB in fact also explains its unwillingness to integrate the pillars or to
commit itself to one indicator pillar with the phenomenon of model
uncertainty. From its point of view, in view of the uncertainties regarding the
adequate theory, the optimal political time window, the structure of the
economy, etc., it is not advisable to be bound to one model, one fixed
indicator system or even to one simple rule.
If the explanations of the ECB are considered from a “Bayesian point of
view”, it would have to be argued that, for example, the weighting of the
pillars in the ECB strategy could be carried out in accordance with the models
that are deemed to be relevant that are included for analysis within the pillars.
In fact, the designation “pillar 1 and 2” and the change in this sequence that
was carried out in 2003 indicate that the ECB has an idea of which pillar or
which associated theoretical approaches it regards as relevant under “normal”
circumstances. 
At the same time, Otmar Issing, the then-ECB’s Chief Economist, speaks in
this context explicitly of the existence of “Knightian uncertainty”, and this,
interestingly, not only in relation to the new foundation of the ECB but also
very generally in relation to (strategic) central bank decisions: “(W)hile the
academic profession has made tremendous progress in analysing risk in
well-defined stochastic economies, the “Knightian” uncertainty that confronts
central bankers is altogether of another dimension.” (Issing, (2002)). The
latest explanations of the ECB to justify the monetary pillar within the
monetary policy strategy emphasise not only, as previously, the long-term
correlation between money and price stability, but also point frequently to the
role of the money supply and credit supply aggregates for a prognosis of asset
price crises. This could result in dangers for price stability in periods still
further in the future that cannot be covered in models for the standard
two-year prognosis. Now, the empirical data show that not all asset price
crises lead to the monetary policy targets being missed by a wide margin.
Asset price crises of this kind that affect the monetary policy targets on
a sustained basis are classical examples of events that are classified in the
run-up as improbable and very difficult to forecast. Seen in this way, taking
the monetary pillar into consideration in the ECB strategy could be
understood as an expression of robust control or as a type of insurance against
conceivably unfavourable developments.
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There have also been major developments with regard to the modelling of
uncertainty in private expectation formation during the past two or three
decades. For example, aspects such as confidence building and reputation
have been increasingly included in the theory of monetary policy. This was
done initially in the framework of so-called reputation models and modified
the previous views concerning the superiority of binding to rules over the
discretionary behaviour of a central bank or a government. Recently, there
have also been attempts to include ambiguity in this monetary policy context.
3.2.1  Bayesian reputation models
In the framework of the time-inconsistency models introduced into monetary
policy in 1983 by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b)
27, given rational expectations,
reputation approaches modelled multiperiod games in which compliance with
notified policies can lead to long-term reputation utility, while the gains from
a surprise inflation (discretionary behaviour) are always only of a short to
medium-term nature. For this reason it is certainly possible within these
models that the government estimates the gain from a surprise inflation too
low to compensate for reputation losses that persist for a longer period.
Consequently, circumstances permitting it will keep to its announcement
without there being a need for rule binding. This is referred to as the
“reputation solution” of the time inconsistency problem.
In the following, I will be considering only the case in which private
individuals do not know the qualities (preferences, incentive structures) of the
politicians, in other words, in which there is uncertainty regarding the
qualities of politicians. 
Whereas in the approach in which knowledge of the qualities of politicians is
assumed, reputation equilibrium is only possible if the time horizon is
infinite, this restriction no longer applies if the environment for action is
uncertain. Reputation can then be included as a solution approach of the
time-inconsistency problem if politicians are in office for longer than one
period and the public is uncertain regarding the qualities of the politicians.
The preferences of politicians with regard to output (or unemployment) and
inflation, or politicians’views on the Phillips curve trade-off, can be regarded
26 Inclusion of uncertainty
27 See Kydland and Prescott (1977) even before this.
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announcements regarding future policies are binding. In situations of this kind
politicians’ behaviour provides information on their qualities. This
information then influences the public’s inflation expectations, and also the
result of the game between the government and private individuals. The basic
idea is simple. The public is uncertain which policy the government will
pursue in future periods. Under plausible assumptions it can be shown that,
the lower the rate of inflation that they observe today, the lower are their
expectations of inflation in future periods. This generates an incentive in
politicians to keep inflation low. This also applies for governments that would
prefer a higher rate of inflation given knowledge/certainty of the public
regarding the qualities of politicians.
This was shown in more detail in various reputation models of adifferent kind,
e.g. from Backus and Drifill (1985) and Barro (1986). (In Annex B I have
sketched a simple reputation model with uncertainty regarding the qualities of
politicians as an illustration.) It is important here that the private economic
subjects draw conclusions on the behaviour of the central bank from the
observed rate of inflation. In other words, they learn during the game. This
increases the incentive for the central bank to behave time-consistently
initially, i.e. in accordance with its announcements. 
Evaluation 
These reputation solutions have been discussed in great detail in the literature.
They appear tempting in that they suggest that, circumstances permitting, the
inflation problem can be solved endogenously even without state institutional
innovations through the immanent costs of loss of reputation on inflationary
policies. And that considerations of reputation play a part in decisions by
politicians appears to go practically without saying. However, the above
reputation models do in fact have some snags. Reputation models with
knowledge of politicians’ qualities show firstly that a reputation solution of
the time-inconsistency problem is only possible in a game with infinite
periods. Even more important, these models produce multiple equilibria and
argue with long-term sanction strategies, although, in view of the great
number of private individuals taking part, it is probably not even possible to
arrive at a consensus for fixing such sanction strategies. This would probably
break down as early as the transaction costs problem and the problem of
asymmetric information is introduced. 
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models described here (and in the Annex B), i.e. those that assume uncertainty
regarding politicians’ qualities and also enable a reputation solution on an
infinite periods game. In particular the assumption that private individuals
carry out learning processes in accordance with the Bayes rule appears
somewhat questionable. The attempt to transmit signals on the preferences of
politicians through exceedingly restrictive monetary and financial policies
can even aggravate the credibility problem in certain circumstances, instead
of alleviating it. The expected loss of output with a programme of this kind
can increase the expectation that the policy will soon be changed and thus
impairs credibility. This makes it questionable that weak politicians really
sense an incentive to mislead for long enough to achieve a reputation as
strong politicians, if it can be assumed that the unemployment that is accepted
in this way is increased endogenously through persistence effects/hysteresis
and the strategy becomes too expensive. Put another way, the credibility that
politicians will keep to an announced strategy depends not only on their
preferences but also on the expected costs of the strategy. The latter namely
influence the enforceability of the strategy or the (political) muscle of the
politicians, and this influences the development of credibility more than the
restrictive degree of policy measures at the start of a programme of
stabilization. Macroeconomic measures that are regarded as not being
enforceable either politically or economically (within the limits of
a democratic system), cannot be credible and lead to self-fulfilling failure (on
this point see, e.g., Drazen and Masson, (1994)).
The reputation solution requires that the monetary policy decision makers
have a long time horizon, in principle, (at least with the same preferences
found among the public) an infinitely long one, and do not discount the results
of future years too heavily. In addition, a reputation solution presupposes that
the monetary policy decision makers must expect a sufficiently high
“penalty” from private market agents on deviations from announced policies,
which itself presupposes a not too high degree of forgetfulness on the part of
private individuals.
28 Finally, given a finite time horizon and uncertainty
regarding politicians’inflation preferences, the number of alternative policies
(politicians) for private individuals, and how great their ignorance of
politicians’ preferences is, also play a part. It seems obvious here that an
attempt should be made to create favourable conditions for fulfilling the
above-mentioned criteria for reputation formation. For example, politicians
28 Inclusion of uncertainty
28 On this topic, see, e.g., Drazen (2000).
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making committee, which decides with a simple majority. In this way, the
“median voter” in the decision making committee, in contrast to individual
politicians, does not have a final period of office.
The strict assumption of rational expectation formation, which in recent
years, as noted above, has been questioned (“softened up”), can be regarded
as a fundamental problem with this approach.
29 One possible alternative is,
instead of assuming decisions under certainty or under risk, to start from
decisions under uncertainty (ambiguity), as in the following section and in
Section 3.1.2 above.
3.2.2  Decisions under ambiguity
The attention that has been paid recently to Knightian uncertainty
(= ambiguity) in the theory of central bank policy (see 3.1 above) has not been
repeated in other monetary policy areas. However, initial approaches can
certainly be found here as well.
Amore recent approach will be referred to below, one that is equivalent to the
compromise approach in Section 3.1.3 above (Spanjers, (2007)). This
ambiguity approach will be examined with regard to its transferability to the
theory of monetary policy. The approach is a generalization of the expected
utility theory and again contains both the above-mentioned Bayesian
approach and the maxmin approach as special cases. And apart from a random
variable x with an (estimated) probability distribution P and a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u, other variables are also taken into
account that determine the utility function U. These additional variables
contain the degree of optimism of the decision maker, β ∈[0,1],
30 his degree
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29 For some time there has been detailed literature on economics that links rational expectations
with learning and the adaptive formation of expectations (Bray, (1982), Bray and Savin, (1986),
Marcet and Sargent, (1989), Woodford, (1990), Bullard and Mitra, (2002)). Acentral finding of this
literature is that in certain circumstances an economy converges under learning to rational
expectation equilibrium (Townsend, (1978), Bray, (1982, 1983), Blume and Easley, (1982)).
However, until the economic subjects have acquired sufficient knowledge of the economy economic
results depend during the transition on adaptive learning processes (Lucas, (1986)). In addition,
economic subjects learn constantly in a changing environment and, if they converge, their opinions
will not converge to afixed rational expectation equilibrium but to an “ergodic” distribution around
this (Sargent, (1999), Evans and Honkapohja, (2001)). However, there is a series of additional
approaches that are occupied with learning processes in the economy (overviews are provided by,
e.g., Clemens and Haslinger, (2001) or Barnett et al. (Ed.), (2004)). However, up to now these have
been included in the theory of monetary policy to a limited extent only.
30Decisions under uncertainty depend, as Keynes and Knight hinted, on the behaviour of decision
makers with regard to the uncertainty. Optimists hope for the best, pessimists fear the worst. 
1_2007  30/5/07  1:37  Stránka 29of confidence in his estimate of probability, γ ∈[0,1], the smallest value of the
natural state s
¯
and the largest value s ¯ that the decision maker regards as
plausible.
31 The utility function, which maps the preferences of the decision
maker, then looks like the following:
(3.4)
The utility function is the sum of three components. The first component
shows the expected utility for this variable. Its weight corresponds to the
degree of confidence in the probability estimate γ. (1–γ) corresponds to the
degree of uncertainty (ambiguity). 
The second component contains the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for the
best plausible result. The weight of this term is (1–γ)⋅β, whereby β shows
the degree to which the decision maker tends to think/assume that uncertainty
implies an advantageous result (“degree of optimism”).
The third component contains the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for the
worst plausible result. The weight of this term is (1–γ)⋅(1–β). 1–β is the
degree to which the decision maker tends to think/assume that uncertainty
implies a disadvantageous result (“degree of pessimism”).
If we place our emphasis on decision makers who tend towards pessimistic
thinking (β = 0), and, in addition (to simplify matters) focus our considerations
on probability distributions that concentrate all probability dimensions in
a single natural state t, we arrive at the following utility function: 
(3.5)
For γ =0 we arrive at the above maxmin approach, for γ =1 at the traditional
(Bayesian) expected utility-approach.
32
30 Inclusion of uncertainty
31 We can understand s
¯
and s ¯ here as the downside and upside risks of the natural state.
32 As was already said, (3.1) and (3.2) are not introduced here ad hoc but are based on the
decision-theoretical micro-basis of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and its further development in
Epstein and Wang (1994) (see Brock, Durlauf and West, (2004) as well).
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This approach provides a possibility of examining the influence of Knightian
uncertainty on monetary policy in more detail. For example, the effect of the
public’s strategic uncertainty with regard to the monetary policy of the central
bank and of state uncertainty on the part of the central bank regarding the
position of the short-term supply curve can be examined under a rule-bound
and (alternatively) a discretionary monetary policy. In the following we will
be concentrating on discretionary monetary policy on strategic uncertainty.
33
In his model Spanjers (2007) assumes a game between the central bank and
the public that follows the approach of Barro and Gordon (1983a, b) in its
material parts. However, and this is the decisive further development, he takes
the uncertainty of private expectation into account. It is assumed in concrete
terms that the public is exposed to uncertainty with regard to the decisions of
the central bank, so-called strategic uncertainty. This means that it expects
that the central bank will select a specific inflation rate, but is not quite certain
whether the central bank will in fact deviate from this in a way that is
unforeseeable.
In the face of the uncertainty regarding the central bank’sstrategy selection the
problem of multiple equilibrium convictions and equilibrium strategies tends
to arise, whereby the model does not put forward any reason for the selection
of aspecific equilibrium. However, it could be assumed that the corresponding
uncertainty convictions (“I believe ..., but I’m not sure ...”) can be understood
as the result of a cognitive process in the shape of plausible upper and lower
limits (upside and downside risks) for inflation (π ¯, π
¯
). The convictions that
describe strategic uncertainty are considered here as an exogenously given
individual characteristic of each player. However, this reveals a potential
weakness of this approach, because convictions of this nature (and a certain
degree of optimism and pessimism) arise in reality through social processes,
just as learning itself is in the end social learning.
34 But this (without a doubt
strong) assumption ensures that even with (strategic) uncertainty or uncertainty
in the Knightian sense the usual concepts of Nash equilibrium and of
backwards induction can continue to be applied.
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33 Spanjers (2007) analyses in addition policies that are rule-bound as well as the case of “state
uncertainty”.
34 In the above model, learning would be in contrast (through an uncertain variable) only an
“undefined” improvement of the information on the upside and downside risks, i.e. “plausible”
upper and lower limits (π ¯, π
¯
) and a reduction of uncertainty.
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above (i.e. β = 0, cf. equation (3.4)). In this case their lack of confidence in
their own estimate implies that in forming their expectations they take
account of the most unfavourable inflation development, weighted with the
extent of the uncertainty (1–γ). This can be expressed formally as follows:
(3.6)
The following results from this for private inflation expectation:
(3.7) π
e = γπ + (1 – γ) π ¯.
In the absence of Knightian uncertainty (γ =1), π
e = π, while with uncertainty
inflation expectations go beyond this, because they explicitly include the
upper limit of the inflation that is held to be possible, π ¯. Spanjers now
integrates this expectation formation hypothesis in a conventional game
theory approach to optimal monetary policy. It is assumed here that the
central bank maximises the following target function:
(3.8)
b describes the weighting of the production target, y
n the natural output, and
π
T the target inflation rate.
The central bank is aiming there for the highest possible output and in
addition would like to avoid deviations of inflation from a target value. Let 
(3.9) y = y
n + a(π – π
e)
apply for the short-term aggregated supply curve, with a as the measure of the
effectiveness of surprise inflation.
This approach allows the discretionary solution of the model to be calculated
as usual as a Nash equilibrium, whereby the expectation hypothesis (3.6) has
to be considered now. The consequence of this is that private inflation
expectations on discretionary monetary policy contain not only the usual
inflation bias ( ) but also a “bonus” for the worst case:
(3.10)
32 Inclusion of uncertainty
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standard discretionary result, i.e. in the distance to the target value plus the
inflation bias. The consequence of this is that the output lies “systematically”
below the natural rate level:
(3.11)
In this approach a greater uncertainty (falling γ) and a worsened assessment
of the “worst case” (rising π ¯) bring about a reduction in production, because
both impulses induce rising inflation expectations in spite of unchanged
inflation.
We will not be dealing here with the details of the results of this study. Some
of Spanjers’results (2007) should certainly be queried. The model-theoretical
acquisition of inflation expectations implies in the end that inflation errors in
the present approach are also possible permanently. It is questionable whether
the processes acquired through Knightian uncertainty can in fact be the
occasion for lasting and systematic expectation errors. And his finding (that
is not shown in more detail here) that a rule-bound monetary policy is more
suited than a discretionary monetary policy for dealing with uncertainty if the
private sector and the central bank tend to pessimism
35 must be taken with
a pinch of salt. I am only interested here in starting a debate on the method
described as a possible alternative, and one capable of development, to the
current (more) usual approaches. 
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35 Put more exactly, the effects of uncertainty point for both policy frameworks in the same
direction, but rules weaken the influence of uncertainty, in comparison with a discretionary policy.
Uncertainty of the effectiveness of a surprise inflation only influences the monetary policy with
a rule-bound monetary policy if the public does not have full confidence in the central bank. What
is decisive (and debatable) with this approach is that the strategic uncertainty of the public with
regard to the monetary policy of the central bank (and so “mistrust” of their announcements) is not
reduced in time but is systematically present.
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We  have seen that, over the past two decades, monetary policy theory has
increased its focus on information and information asymmetries between the
monetary authorities and markets, as well as (more recently) on uncertainty,
as critical elements determining the outcome of monetary policy decisions.
This led in the 1980s to the rise of the New Keynesian economics approach
(information asymmetry is to be seen here as the main reason for price
rigidities) and of the reputation models (see section 3.2.1 above), and over the
last decade has led to further progress in the theory of monetary policy,
particularly with respect to the development of new monetary policy strategy
concepts
36 (for a summary see, e.g., Walsh, (2003b), Woodford, (2003), and
Svensson, (2003, 2005)). Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, it
has significantly changed both the institutional design and the communication
and information policy of central banks. The conventional view nowadays
calls for simple (targeting) rules, for central banking by committees, and for
transparency and efficient communication by central banks. In particular, the
recognition of information asymmetries (and of uncertainty) has led central
banks to use information and communication policy as a strategic instrument
to achieve maximum impact. Here, the conventional conviction among
academics and practitioners has shifted from the conviction that monetary
policy decisions should surprise markets if necessary, to achieve maximum
impact, towards the view that monetary authorities should announce their
policy decisions in a timely manner and with ample explanations.
In this chapter, I shall concern myself with this paradigmatic change in view
and its theoretical foundations and discuss the modern theory of optimal central
bank communication and information policy. This will be done under specific
consideration of the uncertainty surrounding central banks’ decision-making.
One final point to be explored in this context will be whether (how) central
banks should communicate their own uncertainty or “ignorance”.
35
36 The inflation targeting approach in particular comes to mind here.
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Transparency and communication with the general public have gradually
become prominent and challenging tasks for central banks throughout the
world. With the rise of “independent” central banks, transparency and
accountability have become necessary institutional requirements of efficient
(modern) central banking – aiming at overcoming the problems associated with
information asymmetries between central banks and the general public. In
particular, if a prominent opinion within the theory of central bank
communication is followed that says that an (independent) central bank should,
on the one hand, be accountable and, on the other hand, should teach the
markets to think like the central bank, then full transparency (or the reduction
of information asymmetry) appears to be a “must” for modern central banks. 
With this in mind, central bank communication has been increasingly
recognized as an important tool in the implementation of monetary policy
during the last decade. Two cases for central bank communication can be
distinguished here: the political and the economic. Many good reasons for
increasing transparency and central bank communication have been put
forward with regard to both cases. However there are still some controversial
issues to be analyzed in more detail. 
4.1.1 The Rationalization of Central Bank Communication (CBC)
4.1.1.1 The Political Case for CBC: Accountability
The past fifteen years have witnessed a spread of laws prescribing central
bank independence. In the 1990s, numerous countries provided their central
banks with greater legal independence from the government. This trend
towards increased central bank independence has been witnessed in both
industrialized and developing countries. Central bank accountability is now
regarded as a “natural corollary of central bank independence” (Blinder,
(2002)); and central bank communication as a natural corollary of
accountability. The argument is that accountability requires transparency, and
transparency requires external CBC. Acentral bank, being a public institution,
“must be fully accountable for all its actions and procedures. This broad and
uncontroversial principle establishes the basic presumption that all
36 Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication
37 I would like to thank Friedrich Kißmer and Rolf Knütter for research assistance in
structuring this sub-chapter.
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contrary.” (Blinder et al., (2001), p. 22)
4.1.1.2 The Economic Case for CBC: Policy Effectiveness
Here it is useful to differentiate between internal CBC and external CBC. It is
argued that internal CBC leads to better decisions by pooling knowledge –
and thus smoothing information asymmetries within the MPC. External CBC
is supposed to foster the management of expectations of central banks.
(1) Internal CBC: Pooling Knowledge
Asymmetry of information calls for transparency (and communication) of
central banks, and, because of efficiency arguments, for monetary policy by
committees.
In recent years, many central banks have followed the example of the
Bundesbank and the Fed and transferred decision-making powers from asingle
individual to a monetary policy committee. It makes sense to assume that the
members of monetary policy committees may receive, and/or keep, different
information and may have different decision-making skills.
38 Hence,
communication between MPC members may improve the quality of monetary
policy. The reason is that committee members learn from each other. By
sharing information, MPC members may improve their knowledge of future
economic developments. Empirical support for this is provided, for example,
by Gerlach-Kristen (2003a, b) and Meade and Sheets (2005). Hence it should
be beneficial for members to communicate with each other. Without internal
communication, the quality of monetary policy of MPCs could only be
improved by adding members. However, adding members to an MPC also
increases costs: In particular, coordination costs tend to go up progressively.
Therefore, to improve the collective outcome, communication and learning is
important, and becomes the more important, the larger an MPC already is, and
the more diverse information and decision-making skills among the MPC
members are.
Against this background, there is a broad consensus that internal CBC is
beneficial because pooling knowledge in an uncertain world should lead to
Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication 37
38 In contrast, much of the recent (theoretical) literature has assumed that members are
identical in terms of decision making skills but differ in preferences, thereby bringing in strategic
behaviour (see, e.g., Hefeker, (2003), or Sibert, (2003)).
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group decision-making may provide some insurance against possibly extreme
preferences of an individual central banker. In addition, as empirical studies
have demonstrated (see, e.g., Hong and Page (2004), and Blinder and Morgan
(2005)), a diverse group of people who process information and achieve
decisions differently can outperform even highly-skilled individuals when
complex tasks have to be executed.
39
Summing up, internal CBC leads to convergence of knowledge among the
MPC members and, even more importantly, supposedly to an increase in their
average knowledge and hence in their decision-making skills.
(2) External CBC: Management of Expectations
The policy-effectiveness argument of central bank transparency largely
amounts to teaching the markets to “think like the central bank” and thereby
letting the central bank manage expectations of its future policy better
(Blinder, (2006)). The modern view of central banking emphasizes that the
impact of central banks on the economy runs at least as much through their
influence on expectations as through any direct, mechanical instruments
(such as overnight cashing). The reason is that the key decision-makers in an
economy are forward-looking, and therefore a central bank is well advised to
commit itself to a systematic approach to policy, which includes explaining
its decisions to the public. In other words, the public’s understanding of the
central bank’s approach is critical for the effectiveness of monetary policy.
However, nowadays it is regarded as “prudent not to rely too heavily on the
assumption that the public will understand policy perfectly regardless of the
efforts that are made to explain it” (Woodford, (2005), pp. 4–5).
The benefits of CBC, on the one hand, refer to the transmission mechanism:
Central banks, by using their monetary policy instruments, only affect
ashort-term interest-rate directly. More relevant long-term yields (longer-term
interest rates, and asset prices and exchange rates) depend on the expected
future path of short-term interest rates. However, private sector expectations
38 Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication
39 Hong and Page (2004) define diversity so that the members of the group use different
decision-making heuristics. Different people use different decision-making methods (called
heuristics) because “... the implicit optimization problem facing a monetary policy committee is
far too hard to be solved explicitly. It may not even be well defined.” (Blinder, (2006), p. 8).
Accordingly, Blinder and Reis (2005) argued that the Fed under Greenspan has followed
a “risk-management” process rather than trying to optimize.
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Thus, central bank communications can ease the conduct of monetary policy,
notwithstanding the fact that there is also scope for misinterpretation and
overreaction, particularly in financial markets. 
In the short run, CBC is expected to increase the predictability of near-term
policy decisions (by making the central bank’s intentions known), thus
reducing financial market volatility, and allowing for smoother adjustments:
When the private sector uses central bank forecasts to improve its own
forecasts, aggregate uncertainty and volatility can be reduced. In the long run,
communicating the central banks’objectives and policy strategies is expected
to anchor the public’s long-term forecasts or expectations with respect to the
interest rate, inflation, and output-gap (Bernanke, (2005), Issing, (2005a)). 
On the other hand, external CBC is expected to keep the time-inconsistency
problem at bay by reducing the dangers of an inflation bias and a stabilization
bias. Optimal monetary policy can be characterized as ‘constrained discretion’
or as a ‘state-contingent rule’. External CBC is regarded as necessary here
because
– optimal policy is too complex to be explained in a single statement
– it helps monetary policymakers to put the focus on their objectives
– it helps the public to verify whether or not the central bank is pursuing the
mandated objectives 
(Woodford, (2005), Macklem, (2005)).
Increasing transparency is regarded as welfare-improving since it increases
the central bank’s ability to build a reputation and reduce the inflation bias.
40
Transparency may act like an implicit commitment mechanism if it gets
a central bank to adhere to its announced policy more closely by reducing the
scope for surprise inflation. Thus a transparent central bank can build and
maintain a reputation for low inflation.
4.1.2 Controversial Issues
The theoretical literature on transparency appears, however, to have
abstracted too much from the complications that arise when central banks try
to diminish information asymmetries through communication. 
Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication 39
40 This, however, may not apply to increasing transparency about its own ignorance, as argued
below in section 4.3.
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perfectly conveyed. In fact, some models do not even have explicit
announcements. However, in practice it is not trivial to communicate
information effectively and there is a lot of scope for misinterpretation.”
(Geraats, (2006a), p. 144).
In principle, improving the transparency of monetary policy means reducing
information asymmetries between monetary policymakers and the private
sector. However, there is still alack of consensus on whether and to what extent
increasing transparency is beneficial. Various theoretical and empirical
analyses have shown that improving transparency does not necessarily create
social benefits, nor does it necessarily increase central bankers’private utility
(Blinder, (2006), Cukierman, (2001), Geraats, (2006b, 2006c), Gersbach and
Hahn, (2001), Tong, (2005)). In particular, if specific information is not reliable
or the information receiver (i.e., here, the central bank) is uncertain about how
to value specific incoming information, then it may not make sense for the
receiver (the bank) to try to pass this information on to the public without
knowing the consequences (reactions of the markets), i.e. whether the
public/markets really is/are able to correctly understand the kind of uncertainty
that surrounds information. Similar problems arise when acentral bank tries to
pass on information about its own uncertainty/ignorance in the context of
monetary policy decision-making. The question then is how open a central
bank should be about its own uncertainty or “ignorance”.
41
4.1.2.1 The Political Case for CBC
The main argument for (full) transparency of central banks here was: central
bank accountability is a natural corollary of central bank independence;
accountability, however, requires transparency, and transparency demands
open CBC.
Two controversial issues against the above arguments have been brought
forward in the literature.
(1) One issue refers to the difference between legal and actual central bank
independence. In many developing or emerging countries the question arises
whether the delegation of independence to the central bank is actual or only
legal (see Cukierman, (1998)). If it is only “legal”, i.e. only exists on paper, as
is still the case in many transitional countries, there is a danger that it will not
only be ineffective but even counterproductive (Wagner, (1999)). Political
40 Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication
41 On the last question, see section 4.3 below.
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veil of central bank independence.
42 The general question is now: Does the
existence of ‘behind-the-scenes’ political pressure justify some degree of
central bank opacity? Various academics argue that “procedural opaqueness”
(Issing, (1999, 2005a)), or “monetary mystique” (Geraats, (2006b)) could be
efficient ways to prevent political pressures. Geraats presents amodel in which
transparency is only beneficial with central bank independence. If the
government is able to override the central bank’sdecisions, i.e. the central bank
is not completely independent in this regard, uncertainty about economic
information then leads to restraint on the part of politicians concerning
intervention by the government. Hence, the central bank can use the monetary
mystique to obtain greater independence.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that secretive central banks are inherently
undemocratic. However, central banks need public support to be
effective/efficient (Mishkin, (2004)) and only get this support by demonstrating
that they are democratic.
43Apossible counter-argument is that this depends on
the political culture, which differs across countries and over time. 
Furthermore, it must be taken into account that agents are constrained by
limited resources, so that flooding them with data may not help them to
extract the relevant information. Therefore, transparency is sometimes said to
be better understood in terms of openness, clarity and common understanding
(see, e.g., Winkler, (2002)).
(2) Another controversial issue refers to the “quiet revolution” (Blinder,
(2004)) of the above-mentioned increase in central banking by committees.
The question here is: Should members of a monetary policy committee have
individual accountability or just group accountability? Acommon-sense view
seems to be emerging here that argues that this depends on the internal structure
of the committee. A distinction has to be made here between individualistic
committees and collegial committees. Individualistic committees (the Bank of
England is a prime example) are those whose members not only express their
own opinions verbally (internal CBC), but probably also act on them by voting.
In contrast, collegial committees agree in advance and arrive at a group
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42 However, even in industrialized countries central bank independence is not “perfect”; i.e.,
‘behind-the-scenes’ political pressure exists even here (see, e.g., Kißmer and Wagner, (2004b)).
43 Moreover, it may be argued that transparency may bolster central bank independence (Buiter,
(1999)). While Mishkin (2004) tends to refer to the exertion of influence in a party-political way,
Buiter (1999) stresses the regional aspect in a monetary union (the EMU). 
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(2006)) between “genuinely-collegial committees” (prime example: the
ESCB) where the members argue strenuously for their own views behind
closed doors, but compromise ultimately on a group decision, and
“autocratically-collegial committees” (prime example: the US Fed under
Greenspan) where the chairman dictates the group “consensus”. 
A consensus view appears to be emerging that the appropriate volume and
style of central bank communication depends on the type of central bank
committee. That is, votes and minutes should be disclosed in individualistic
committees whereas disclosure of votes may not be very informative in
collegial committees (Blinder, (2006)). In the latter case, publishing dissenting
votes may impair the committee’s ability to project the desired aura of
consensus. Moreover, the formal vote may be a poor indicator of the actual
amount of disagreement in a collegial committee (i.e. one that demands
consensus). Indeed, procedural transparency may make it more difficult to
reach a consensus view within collegial committees (Issing, (2005a)).
Moreover, some models argue that voting transparency may be problematic if,
on the one hand, external interest groups try to influence committee decisions
biased toward special interest policy, and, on the other hand, central bankers
focus too much on appearing to be competent individuals and less on overall
problems (see, e.g., Gersbach and Hahn, (2001)). If members of a committee
know that their arguments will become public they may be affected in their
voting behavior in a political and private sense (Cukierman, (2005)).
4.1.2.2 The Economic Case for CBC
The main argument for CBC here is two-fold. Adifferentiation must be made
between internal and external CBC. 
(1) Internal CBC
The argument for internal CBC is: Internal CBC should lead to better
monetary policy decisions by pooling knowledge.
The main controversial issue here is: 
There may be doubts about the general effect. Recently, Berk and Bierut (2005)
have shown, in an admittedly very stylized model, that the value of internal
CBC may depend on the degree of skill asymmetry. If skill asymmetry is very
high, it may be beneficial to exclude presumably less-skilled committee
members (this could possibly be the non-hub-members) from information
42 Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication
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be a stable, superior institutional solution. While the hub may have better
access to information, the non-hub has normally got the voting majority, so it
will be difficult to exclude the non-hub-members from information sharing.
(2) External CBC
The argument for external CBC was that it should foster the management of
expectations of central banks by getting the public “to think like the central
bank”.
There are several controversial issues here: 
They refer to the communication of the
(i) objectives
(ii) strategy
(iii) decision-making of central banks.
Open questions here are:
44
(i)  How open should central banks be about their loss function?
(ii)  How open should central banks be about their forecasts? And: How
should central banks communicate their likely future policies?
Furthermore, how should central banks communicate the role of asset
prices?
(iii)  How open should central banks be about disagreements among
decision-makers? In addition, should central bankers communicate in
a collegial manner or in an individualistic way? 
I shall briefly describe (1) the practice of central banks and (2) theoretical
findings with respect to (a) the desirability and (b) the feasibility of
transparency in relation to the above three issues and the related open
questions.
(i) Communication of Objectives
It has often been claimed that central banks should be clear about their
objectives in order to anchor the public’s expectations. For example,
Svensson (2005) demands that central banks should reveal their intertemporal
loss function.
Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication 43
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targets. However, there is still a “dirty little secret of central banking”
(Mishkin, (2004), p. 20): That is, there is an opaque concern about output
fluctuations (‘real stability’).
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(2)The theoretical findingson the question of how to communicate central bank
objectives have been mixed (and are not easy to summarize). Ishall differentiate
between results regarding desirability and feasibility of transparency.
(a) The Desirability of Transparency and Clear CBC:
Transparency about objectives has been argued to increase the sensitivity of
the public’s expectations. This may be beneficial for reputation building
(Faust and Svensson, (2001)). It may also be a substitute for otherwise
time-consuming learning by the private sector (Orphanides and Williams,
(2005)) and may therefore foster stabilization policies.
However, there are also reasons why more openness about objectives may
hamper stabilization policies: Jensen (2002) shows in the context of
a two-period model with a New Keynesian Phillips curve (characterized by
forward-looking inflation expectations) that clear CBC about central bankers’
intentions faces a trade-off between reputation building (credibility) and
output stabilization. The private sector uses the output gap (only imperfectly
controlled by the central bank through an unobservable policy instrument) as
a signal to form its inflation expectations in the next period. As in Faust and
Svensson (2001), higher transparency (regarding control errors) renders the
signal more accurate, and, by raising the sensitivity of inflation expectations,
increases the costs to reputation of deviating from the inflation target. Hence,
there are benefits from increasing transparency: The credibility of the central
bank increases and the inflation biases will be reduced. On the other hand, the
trade-off between inflation and output may worsen, as Jensen shows.
Transparency here may actually be a policy-distorting straitjacket if the
central bank enjoys low-inflation credibility and there is need for active
monetary stabilization policy. The intuition behind this argument is that, with
forward-looking inflation expectations, the higher the degree of transparency,
the smaller the impact of an inflation surprise on output.
46
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45 This will be dealt with in more detail in section 4.2 below.
46 In contrast, Woodford (2003, 2005) strongly opposes the view that taking the market by
surprise is a prerequisite for effectiveness in monetary policy. For him, monetary policy is
effective only when the central bank can shape the beliefs of market participants. By improving
its signals about policy actions and policy targets, the central bank can enable the private sector to
anticipate future central bank actions more accurately, thereby increasing the effectiveness of its
monetary policy.
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increased transparency, particularly a central bank announcement of its
objective function or projections of the path of the policy interest rate, will
complicate the communication process and weaken support for a central bank
focus on long-run objectives. Transparency can indeed go too far.”
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And Geraats (2006c) argues that though central banks should be clear about
their inflation targets, they should communicate output targets with
ambiguity: “... central bankers should speak, but with mystique.” (Geraats,
(2006c), p. 21)
(b) The Feasibility of Transparency and Clear CBC:
It might also be argued that transparency is desirable, but not feasible.
Goodhart (2001) and Cukierman (2005), for example, both stress central
banks’ own ignorance about parameters of the loss function: i.e. the relative
weighting of output stabilization, the output gap and output targets may be
unknown to central bankers themselves (for more detail, see section 4.2
below).
The question arises here again whether and how central banks/bankers should
signal their own ignorance. This will be dealt with in more detail below in
section 4.3.
(ii) Communication of Strategy
Various controversial issues have been at the forefront of the academic
discussion here. One major issue refers to publishing forecasts and the future
course of policy; another major issue is communicating about asset price
(boom-and-bust) possibilities.
A. Publishing Forecasts and the Future Course of Policy
The public’s forward-looking expectations are based on assessments of future
monetary policy. It has often been stressed that central banks have to signal
the future course of monetary policy in order to steer the public’s expectations
(see, e.g., Woodford, (2005)).
(1) In practice, numerous central banks (not only those that target inflation)
publish inflation/output-gap forecasts today. However, only a few central
banks publish forecasts that are conditioned on their likely future policy.
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47 My emphasis. In general, the theoretical literature on central bank transparency has so far
produced a variety of partly contradictory results, depending upon model assumptions and the
particular information asymmetry under consideration. 
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suggest that publishing conditioned forecasts would be desirable.
(a) The Desirability of Transparency and Clear CBC:
Svensson (2002) and Woodford (2005), for example, argue that central banks
should publish projections of the policy interest path. By doing this, they argue,
the public’s understanding of monetary policy can be improved, it can be
helped to evaluate the quality of central banks’forecasts, and the incentives of
the central banks to produce good forecasts would be increased. For them,
monetary policy is principally the ‘management of expectations’ (Woodford,
(2005), p. 3). As a consequence, there is good reason for a central bank to
commit itself to a systematic approach to policy. Publishing and justifying the
central bank’s best forecast of inflation, output, and the instrument rate is
argued to be the most effective way to manage expectations. It should provide
the best internal central bank incentives to get it right, and provide the best
information for external evaluation, and therefore the best accountability.
(b) The Feasibility of Transparency and Clear CBC:
Though the above arguments for desirability appear to be convincing, various
problems or hindrances may arise: Publishing forecasts and the future course
of policy may complicate the decision-making process (Goodhart, (2001)),
and the public may underestimate the risks of forecasts and may pay too much
attention to information provided by the central banks (Morris and Shin,
(2002)). Morris and Shin (2002) show that, if private subjects do not have
sufficient private information, disclosure of public information is always
beneficial; but if valuable private information already exists, the welfare
effect of increased disclosure of public information is not unambiguous.
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B. Communication on Potential Asset Price Boom-and-Busts
There have been many dangerous-looking asset and house price booms in
many countries over the world during the last decade or so. There has also
been a lively debate about the optimal monetary reaction to these asset and
house price booms.
49 Rapidly rising asset (or house) prices may create serious
challenges for CBC. Rising asset prices may be a threat to monetary policy
objectives if asset prices reach unsustainable levels. But not all asset price
booms result in busts, and asset price busts are not always followed by severe
consequences for inflation, output or financial stability (see Detken and
46 Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication
48 However, see Svensson (2006) for a critical discussion of this argument.
49 See, e.g., Funke, Kißmer and Wagner (2006).
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ex ante. Even if the identification problem was solved, it is difficult to
discover the optimal monetary policy. Even if both problems were solved, it
may be difficult to communicate the optimal policy to the public if this policy
involves a reaction with respect to rising asset prices.
Nevertheless, central bankers have to act; and they have a choice between two
main policy options if they observe rapidly rising asset (house) prices. They can
choose either a pro-active strategy or a reactive strategy. When following a pro-
active strategy, policy takes into account how the policy instrument can influence
the probability of a future crisis. The basic idea here is to counter pre-emptively
the build-up of acrisis scenario by responding to an asset price boom. In contrast,
when following a reactive strategy, policy takes the probability of a future crisis
as given. The basic idea here is to avoid immediate costs that are associated with
a pre-emptive response by mitigating only the consequences of an expected or
actual asset price bust. The conventional wisdom (among academics and central
bankers) today appears to be that central bankers should adopt areactive strategy.
In many cases, the reactive strategy is supposed to be consistent with a policy of
‘benign neglect’towards asset price booms. Monetary policy here only reacts if
and when an asset price crash occurs.
(1) In central banking practice, we have seen different routes taken during
the recent past.
At the Fed under Greenspan, external CBC seemed to be consistent with
‘benign neglect’, whereas internal CBC appeared to be inconsistent with
‘benign neglect’ (see Cecchetti, (2003)).
At the ECB, the monetary pillar appears to play a strategic role in fighting the
danger of asset price bubbles (see Issing, (2005b)).
At the BoE, strategic changes have been considered, particularly with respect
to extending the forecast horizon, (see, e.g., Bean, (2003), King, (2002)).
(2) Theoretical studies have found ambiguous results about the optimal
monetary response to asset (house) price booms. One alternative response is
so-called ‘benign neglect’. The question arises whether a strategy of this
nature should be made transparent. If the central bank communicates ‘benign
neglect’ (including the promise to help out when bubbles burst), then moral
hazard may be produced:
– In the boom phase, the so-called “Greenspan put” (Miller et al., (2001))
may arise; i.e., the observed risk premium in the stock market may be
reduced by one-sided intervention policy on the part of the central bank,
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against downside risk. Miller et al. propose in the case of overvalued
markets a clear “...announcement that prices are irrational and that the
market will not in fact be supported at any level” (p. 19). This would
include the risk of a market collapse.
Another alternative would be for shareholders to abandon their erroneous
beliefs and thus learn that the insurance was an illusion. This could lead to
a gradual disappearance of the bubble, as Miller et al. (2001) show in
a stylized example.
– In the bust phase, the “risk of interest rate gap”
50 (Illing, (2004)) may occur;
i.e. a policy attempting to soften ex post the impact of negative systemic
shocks on one asset market (e.g. the stock market) may encourage investors
to build up even more serious imbalances on another asset market (e.g. house
market), thus aggravating the underlying risks. In the end, the central bank
has to stabilize the economy by raising interest rates. Illing recommends that
the central bank helps orderly unwinding financial imbalances through
a strategy where highly leveraged private investors only should be given
very precise signals so they can unwind their positions, whereas all the other
private agents do not get information in order to prevent triggering of
destabilization of the financial system. As he admits, this requires a highly
awkward communication strategy (‘creative ambiguity’).
In addition, optimal reactive policy differs from ‘benign neglect’ if the
public’sforward-looking expectations are important. In this case, even apurely
reactive policy adjusts policy instruments during asset price booms, as has
recently been shown by Berger, Kißmer and Wagner (2007). Communication
here needs to be two-way: policymakers may be forced to react to
a deterioration of public’s forward-looking expectations in the boom period.
51
(iii) Communication of the Decision-Making Process
(1) In practice, there are central banks that are collegial in communication
and individualistic in decision-making (prime example: the Bank of
England), and other central banks that are individualistic in communication
48 Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication
50 In an interest rate gap a central bank has to deal with the following dilemma: If it raises the
interest rate too much, a credit crunch on the domestic market may be the consequence. If it leaves
the interest rate too low, it risks the amplification of existing imbalances.
51 Other challenges refer to the fact that central banks have simultaneously to address various
audiences. Hence, trade-offs may arise, the same message may be understood differently and CBC
will need to be strategic. See, e.g., Issing (2005a). 
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collegial in both communication and decision-making (see Blinder, (2006),
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, (2005)). 
(2) Against this empirical background, recent theoretical studies have shown
that “one-size-doesn’t-fit-all”; i.e. the optimal nature of CBC depends on the
framework within which it operates (Blinder, (2006)).
52 In other words, it is
unlikely that there is a single best approach to central bank communication.
Nevertheless, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) found that the ECB and the Fed
have been more effective than the BoE. They analyzed the strategies and
effectiveness of communication by the US Fed, the Bank of England, and the
ECB. They found that effectiveness of communication is not independent of
the decision-making process in the respective committee. As argued above, the
US Fed has an individualistic communication, but acollegial decision-making,
whereas the Bank of England has collegial communications, but individualistic
decision-making; and the ECB is collegial both in communication and
decision-making. Ehrmann and Fratzscher analyze empirically how these
differences impact the effectiveness of communication. They find that
predictability of policy and the reaction of financial markets to communication
is highest for the US Fed and the ECB and lower for the Bank of
England’s MPC.
On the other hand, the ECB has often been blamed for its opaque
communication (e.g., Jansen and de Haan, (2004)), and with regard to the US
Fed, Reinhart and Sack (2006) showed that the greatest financial market
effects have been associated with FOMC statements and testimonies. In
contrast, speeches of individual members have had little impact. Their results
support the view that there are advantages to collegial CBC. 
4.2 Uncertainty and Central Bank Communication
In section 3.1 above, we have already mentioned that over the past few years
an increasing emphasis has been laid on uncertainty (including in the sense of
ambiguity or ignorance) as a feature of the monetary policy landscape. First
this has occasionally been done by central bankers highlighting that they have
to act under much stronger circumstances of uncertainty than those assumed
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52 In the words of Rachel Lomax (deputy governor of the Bank of England): “Institutional and
political arrangements matter. What works in one environment may not work elsewhere.” (Lomax,
(2005), p. 16).
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53 With a certain time lag, academics
have also begun to consider or mention “incalculable” (or, Knightian)
uncertainty in theorizing about central banking.
54 The questions that arise here
are what this “stronger uncertainty” exactly means, whether (and how) central
bankers should signal this strong uncertainty or “ignorance” to the public (on
the latter question see section 4.3. below), and, last not least, whether the
opaqueness of central bankers prevalent in practice can be explained by this
“ignorance”. 
4.2.1 Opacity of Central Banks
We have seen that that there is a consensus view in monetary economics today
that transparency is desirable, on the one hand because it enhances the
democratic accountability of central banks, and on the other hand because it
provides better control of the public’s expectations by the central banks.
However, we have also emphasized some controversial issues above, which
may call for less than complete transparency. In addition, central banks are
not very clear in practice about their conduct of monetary policy. So far, to
my knowledge, no central bank has made clear statements about its objective
function.
55 In spite of the publication of inflation reports, minutes, speeches
etc., central banks have given very little information to the public about the
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53 For example, Issing already 1999 emphasized that “while the academic profession has made
tremendous progress in analysing risk in well-defined stochastic economies, the “Knightian”
uncertainty that confronts central bankers is altogether of another dimension (...).” (Issing, (2002))
Also Greenspan recently argued that “(...) uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the
monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape.” (Greenspan, (2004),
p. 36; see also the citations in Blinder and Reis, (2005)). See also in section 3.1 above.
54 For example, Feldstein remarked that “(...) dealing with uncertainty is the essence of making
monetary policy.” (Feldstein, (2004), p. 42). Meltzer even highlighted the prevalence of Knightian
uncertainty: “Uncertainty, in Frank Knight’s sense, is not a central problem; it is the central
problem.” (Meltzer, (2005), p. 101) Walsh argued that, in the modern theories of monetary policy,
“the central bank is assumed to know the true model of the economy and observe accurately all
relevant variables. The sources and properties of economic disturbance are also taken to be known.
Uncertainty arises only due to the unknown future realizations of these disturbances. (...) In
practice, policy choices are made in the face of tremendous uncertainty about the true structure of
economy, the impact policy actions have on the economy, and even about the current state of the
economy.” (Walsh, (2004), p. 2)
55 The typical objective function assumed in theoretical models of central banking is like the
following: Lt = (πt – π
*)
2 + α(yt – y ¯t)
2, where πt and yt denote inflation and output in period t, π
*
the inflation target, y ¯ the potential output and α the relative weight on output-gap stabilization. The
objective function is quadratic since it is assumed that the central bank is equally averse to positive
and negative deviations from output and inflation targets. In order to take the future into account 
an intertemporal loss function of the following type is usually considered:  , where
β is a discount factor and Et denotes expectations based on information in period t.
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gap in comparison to the stabilization of the inflation gap. Neither have they
given information about the shape of central bank losses as a function of those
two arguments, nor about the discount factor between current and future
objectives (β). However, knowledge/transparency particularly regarding the
parameter α is essential for the assessment of monetary policy by the public;
and it would also be essential for the transparent implementation of targeting
rules of the kind recommended by Svensson (2003). 
With respect to the shape of central bank losses, current academic wisdom
assuming that the shape of losses is quadratic appears not to be consistent
with the practice of central banking.
56 In practice, as recent empirical
evidence suggests, central banks apparently have responded more strongly to
anticipated negative output gaps compared to a positive output gap of the
same absolute size. This kind of asymmetry is argued to imply that the loss
function of the central bank exhibits a precautionary demand for expansions
57
(see Cukierman and Gerlach, (2003); Ruge-Murcia, (2003)).
58 Central banks
themselves are largely silent on this apparent difference in attitude. I am not
aware of any central bank that has published a statement explicitly saying that
its losses are quadratic (or non-quadratic) in the output gap.
4.2.2 Reasons Behind This Opacity
The question is what may be the reason behind this opacity of central banks
with respect to this point. We may guess that this is due mainly to central
banks’ limited knowledge (and hence, uncertainty) about the economy. The
latter implies feasibility constraints on transparency that are more serious than
is assumed in stylized models of the transmission mechanism.
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56 The main reason for using quadratic approximation for the loss function in monetary theory
is analytical tractability and the nice properties of quadratic loss functions, being the applicability
of the certainty equivalence and separation principles under this specific condition. Certainty
equivalence means that the optimal monetary policy can be modeled by employing an efficient
estimate of the state of the economy as if it was known with certainty. For applied work, it is
desired for decisions in an uncertainty context to have a model where uncertainty is treated in such
a way that the decision problems are as simple as the equivalent ones in a certainty framework.
Separation signifies that the filtering and the optimization problems can be solved separately. This
significantly simplifies the calculation of optimal policies, and it removes the need to know the
whole shape of the loss function.
57 Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) argue that this may lead to an equilibrium that exhibits an
inflation bias, even if the output target of the central bank equals the potential output.
58 Blinder ((1998), pp. 19, 20) also stated that: “In most situations the central bank will take
far more political heat when it tightens preemptively to avoid higher inflation than when it eases
preemptively to avoid higher unemployment.”
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potential output. This imposes severe objective limits on the ability of central
banks to be transparent about the output gap. Central banks may even detect
(or suppose) circumstances in which excessive transparency is (assumed to
be) actually detrimental (see below in section 4.3)). Be that as it may, central
banks are likely to shy away from making a long term commitment to
a relative output gap weight to be attached to a highly uncertain output gap
measure. Because of such measurement problems, Orphanides (2003) even
recommended taking the output gap completely out of the loss function.
Another reason for opacity about the relative weight on output gap
stabilization in the loss function of a central bank may be that monetary policy
today is usually made by a committee, in which not all members share the
same alpha, i.e. do not have the same priorities. Knowledge of this could lead
the public to the possibly wrong conclusion that the monetary policy process
is more uncertain than it really is. Hence, central banks shy away from being
transparent about this diversity about the relative weight of alpha. Moreover,
they may fear that committee members, knowing that their personal views
will become public information, may be driven in their statements and in their
voting behavior by short term political and personal career considerations
(Cukierman, (2005)). 
Against this background, Alex Cukierman, for example, comes to the
following conclusion (Cukierman, (2005), pp. 3–4): “since sufficiently high
transparency is now in place and is part of the orthodoxy, time has come to
take a more realistic, and perhaps, more balanced look at the limits of its
feasibility and of its desirability.”
However, it may be argued that transparency has by far not yet reached the
desirable optimal level at most central banks. Nevertheless, against the
background of feasibility constraints, the above objection is apparently (or,
should be) taken serious by central banks that have to determine their degree
of transparency about their monetary policy and their own uncertainty or
ignorance. We have seen above that central bankers are conceding (or daring
to concede) more and more that they have to choose monetary policy under
conditions of “real”, i.e., Knightian uncertainty (see footnote 53). However, it
is not clear yet what this means for the desirability and feasibility of the
central banks’ transparency. 
On the other hand, we can assume that the kind of thinking about uncertainty
affects the choice of strategy and communication of central banks. For
52 Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication
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him to value flexibility as a higher priority than commitment and therefore
never to announce a commitment to any particular target inflation rate
(Mankiw, (2006)).
59
4.2.3 The Role of Low Probability Extreme Events
The increasing emphasis of “real” uncertainty by central bankers may also
partly be based on the increasing significance of the financial stability
objective in central banking in the era after the Asian crisis.
60There is a fear of
the outbreak of financial crises that represent low-probability extreme events
that threaten central banks as a potential danger. The question arises here of
whether central banks should be open about (potential or planned) deviations
from simple rules in the event of low-probability extreme events, i.e. whether
it may be desirable for a central bank to specify in advance the (imagined)
contingencies and its (planned) course of action, particularly in case of
low-probability extreme events (e.g., asset or house-price bubbles etc.), and
whether a central bank should disseminate its private information about such
threats in real time.
It may be regarded as “counterproductive and highly risky to publish advance
signals about potential problems in parts of the financial systems... (This) may
induce a run on the banks (...), may even trigger a crisis (...). (The) publication
of advance warnings may be misinterpreted by the public and lead to a panic.”
(Cukierman, (2005), pp. 15–16) 
This argues for withholding advance signals about problems in the financial
system. However, there are also other opinions arguing for transparency. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, advocates greater
transparency, in both economic policy and in data on economic and financial
developments, as this is supposed to be critical for smoothly functioning
national economies and a stronger international monetary system (IMF,
(2006)). In this regard, the IMF has adopted several measures that aim to
improve the transparency of its members’ policy and data, putting forward
that the publication of staff reports and the like could strengthen the
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59 Mankiw described Greenspan’s policy as “covert inflation targeting” (Mankiw, (2006),
p. 183). This, however, may be questioned, as inflation targeting is (or should be) more than just
aiming for a measured inflation rate of a specific number.
60 “Since I have been on the Committee, we have spent at least half our allotted forecasting
time debating longer term issues, such as the effect of structural change in the labour market and
the relationship between house price inflation and consumption.” (Lomax, (2005), p. 4).
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(2003)). Glennester and Shin (2003) find that the reforms, the IMF introduced
to promote transparency, have created more informed markets. Petersen and
Sullivan (2005) note that a inadequate transparency by international
organizations as well as national governmental units is a contributing factor
to the serious financial disturbances that have plagued the global economy in
the recent past. Meanwhile, the lack of accurate and timely information on
financial developments aggravates the financial weaknesses and contributes
to the emergence of crises situations, indicating that the cost of withholding
information can be high (e.g., if an asset price bubble bursts and a costly
financial crisis breaks out). 
If central banks see a major task of monetary policy to be dealing with
low-probability extreme events (or even no-probability events, i.e., Knightian
uncertainty),
61 the question arises of whether simple rules (such as simple
Taylor type rules) then are appropriate. The central bank will like to deviate
from such rules in the case of such extreme events or contingencies. However,
the problem is that the central bank will have difficulties defining ex ante
exactly the probability of a low-probability extreme event of this type (or
even cannot imagine the event at the moment), and/or – even if it can
determine the probability of the occurrence of the event – it may have
problems determining the associated cost in the case of occurrence of this
event (example: ex-ante costs of terrorist attacks). Svensson (2003)
recommended for such cases a so-called “general targeting rule” in which
only the target variables, the targets and the loss function are specified, but
without any commitment to a particular reaction function.
We have seen above, however, that even being clear and transparent about the
loss function is not an easy task. This has to be seen against the background
of the described uncertainty/ignorance of central bankers, and it again raises
the question of how open a central bank should be about its own “ignorance”.
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61 It has to be remembered that central banks “first came into being in order to avert financial
crises and the related extreme fluctuation in interest rates. They were, and still are, expected to
fulfill this function by acting as lenders of last resort in the face of extreme events that could
endanger financial stability.” (Cukierman, (2005), p. 15).
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Ignorance?
We  have already emphasized above that central banks operate under
substantial uncertainty with respect to
– the measurement or reliability of economic variables or data (“data
uncertainty”)
– the structure of the economy (“parameter and model uncertainty”)
– the consequences of their actions (“strategic uncertainty”)
– their own internal forecasts and objectives
(see above in sections 3.1 and 4.2).
The main questions arising here are:
1) Do central banks signal this uncertainty/ignorance to the public and how
do they do this?
2) Should central banks signal this uncertainty/ignorance to the public and
how should they do this?
4.3.1 (How) Do Central Banks Signal Their Ignorance to the Public? 
As we have argued above, over the past ten years or so central banks have
become more open about their inflation targets and their monetary policy
course, and many of them today regularly publish inflation forecasts.
However, there is still an opaque concern about output fluctuations (‘real
stability’), and only a few central banks publish forecasts that are conditioned
on their likely future policy. This has (as we have argued) to be seen against
the background of the probable ignorance of central banks about parameters
of the loss function and other uncertainties surrounding central banking. 
We  can differentiate between two types of uncertainty: (i) the asymmetry
between the knowledge of the central bank and market participants, and (ii)
the uncertainty with which that knowledge is held. Furthermore, there is an
interdependence between the central bank’s knowledge, and uncertainty, and
those of the market participants, as each enter into the expectations of the
others. The decisions of both types of agents are based on an understanding
of the causal mechanisms at work in the economy, and of the likely effects of
monetary policy action. Formal economic models, and econometric analyses,
provide a mechanism for central banks’ expressing and communicating their
own understanding of these causal mechanisms.
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Central banks are confronted with the question of how open they should be
about their model uncertainty. Model uncertainty captures the fact that central
bankers are not necessarily confident enough to rely on prognoses that rely on
a single model, and therefore compare these with prognoses that are based on
alternative models, and furthermore, with information that was acquired
through different processes (see above in section 3.1)). If central banks are
transparent or open on this, and thus inform private subjects about the fact
that they derive their forecasts from several stochastic models, but do not (or
cannot) teach them exactly how this is done (because flooding them with
technical details which they do not understand will not improve the
understanding on the part of the general public), the uncertainty of the private
subjects about central bank behavior might increase. If a central bank goes on
to concede (i) that it is ignorant about (for example) the right relative weight
factors to be attributed to the various models from which the forecasts are
derived, and (ii) that possibly no one model within the model portfolio of the
central bank may provide an adequate base for monetary policy (full
transparency would have to include this information as well), the uncertainty
of the market participants about the effectiveness of monetary policy and the
competence of central bankers may be increased further. 
Against this background, central banks today at most generally emphasize
that their monetary policy decisions are based not only on forecasts derived
from econometrical analyses (formal methods), but also on information
acquired through informal methods such as judgment and intuition.
62 Model
uncertainty implies that decision-making requires the exercise of judgment.
One question here is how to reveal the collective judgment of a monetary
policy committee. The main, as yet unsolved, challenge, however, is to
analytically combine both, the formal and the informal, bases of central
banks’ decision-making within one analytical model:
63 Up to now,
quantifiable risk (calculable uncertainty) is captured by inflation (and output
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62 Not many central banks are very open on this yet. Openness about uncertainty is anyway
a relatively recent feature in central banking, and not yet widely spread among central banks.
A relatively open central bank in this respect is the Bank of England (at least during the past few
years). 
63 For the short term, first solution attempts have recently been offered (Svensson, (2005)). It
appears to be (even) more difficult to analytically combine bases related to different time horizons.
This also corresponds to a recent appeal by Axel Weber and others (from the Bundesbank and the
ECB) to strengthen the effort to find a single analytical framework for uniting the foundations of
the first and the second pillar of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. So far, only the first pillar is
analytically founded by model-based theory. 
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caught by “verbal explanations” (in the Minutes, Inflation Reports etc.),
without a common analytical foundation of the two bases. This tension (if
perceived by the public) between these two bases creates, or increases, signal
uncertainty
64 with respect to central bank pronouncements. 
4.3.1.2 Publication of Fan Charts
One prominent way for a central bank to signal its own uncertainty or
ignorance is to publish so-called “fan charts” for the path of interest rates. By
doing this, a central bank tries to make clear that it is not committing itself to
a definite path, but that the expected evolution will depend on a variety of
contingencies, which can at best be assigned probabilities. Insofar, the fan
chart is seen as “an effective device for communication about the uncertainty
around the published interest-rate path” (Woodford, (2005)).
The Bank of England, for example, has published its projections in the form
of “fan charts”, since February 1996.
65 A fan chart displays a range of bands
around a central forecast. 
The fan charts of the Bank of England, which are published quarterly, are so
constructed that the colored bands cover 90 % of the area (nine bands, and
a 10% probability of the actual inflation rate falling within each band), so
there is a 10 %-chance that the inflation will be outside the colored zone
(Bank of England, (2002), pp. 48–49).
In August 2004, the Bank of England decided to base its forecasts on market
interest rates rather than on constant interest rates (Bank of England, (2004),
Allen and Mills, (2005), Lomax, (2005)). This decision was associated with
an extension of publishing forecasts from two to three years into the future.
This step was seen as “a very modest step towards greater transparency”
(Lomax, (2005), p. 15). 
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64 “Signal uncertainty” means that there is a lack of clarity in the signal of MPC thinking.
Signal uncertainty can exist even if there was no model uncertainty, due to the fact that the success
of any act of communication relies not just on the intentions of the sender but on how the signal
is interpreted by the recipient. This also implies that economic communication occurs in a strategic
context (see Dow et al., (2007)). In other words: “To suspicious observers, signals are always
ambiguous. Once doubt exists – and how can it be fully removed? – it irremediably pervades every
central bank pronouncement, no matter how hard the central bank tries to be transparent. Its
signals stand to be misinterpreted or exaggerated.” (Blinder et al., (2001), p. 15)
65 “The motivation was purely to illustrate the uncertainty inherent in all economic
projections.” (Lomax, (2005), p. 7)
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MPC’s subjective assessment of inflationary pressures evolving through time,
based on a central view and the risks surrounding it” (Britton et al., (1998),
p. 31). Further, “the uncertainty in the subjective assessment of inflation
relates to how likely it is that the future events will differ from the central
view. It is therefore a forward-looking view of the risks to the forecast, not
a mechanical extrapolation of past uncertainty.” (ibid. p. 32).
One objection here is that the ”language quoted above is that of the Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU) approach whereby, even if there is no concrete
objective basis for probability estimates, these can be assigned subjectively.
Here, the requirement is stronger, that the MPC arrive at a collective
subjective assignation of ex ante probabilities to the risks attached to the
central forecast. But there is no formal basis for doing this, given the
derivation of the central forecast from a suite of models to which judgment is
applied following lengthy deliberations. Rather, the fan charts apply
a forward-looking modeling approach to calculating the risks attached to the
central forecast on the basis of past errors; it is only the degree of skewness
which is the outcome of subjective judgment (Nikolov, (2002)).” (Dow et al.,
(2007))
66
As mentioned before, these fan charts can only capture one part of the
uncertainty surrounding central banks’ monetary decisions, namely the
quantifiable part (and this is done on the basis of possibly artificial,
questionable methodological assumptions). This, however, would have to be
reconciled with the accompanying judgment (based on intuition) that captures
the unquantifiable part of central bank’s uncertainty (that is unavoidable if
central banks have also to deal with low-probability extreme events
(associated, for example, with the task of avoidance of financial crises)). The
other question is how to communicate this “judgmental gap” between
econometrically based forecasts and actual decision-making of MPCs.
67
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66 This is a typical objection raised in the Keynesian literature. Conventional judgment has
often been thought of in terms of prior beliefs. Uncertainty is then a matter of belief in
a proposition, measured by probability. However, this quantified probability is arrived at
subjectively. A central question raised in the Keynesian literature refers to the origins of the prior
subjective judgment. For (post-)Keynesians, uncertainty is defined as risk that is “unquantifiable”
(Dow, (2004)). Therefore, intuition must be the final determinant of policy decisions. One of the
conclusions is that judgment requires much more analytical attention than it is currently given in
the literature.
67 “No set of economic projections [owned by MPC members]... can ever be the outcome of
a purely model-based operation. Judgment always plays a large role – although different people
frame their judgments in more or less model-based ways.” (Lomax, (2005), p. 4)
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one channel for communicating the thinking of uncertainty of monetary
policy committees. Other channels rely on the MPC Minutes, the Inflation
Report, etc. We can also draw other indicators of uncertainty from these other
channels:
(i) quantitative indicators (such as the ‘ZEW-Wording Indikator’)
68, and
(ii) qualitative indicators: these are discourse-based uncertainty indices
(see, e.g., Rosa and Verga, (2005a, b), and Klaes and Sent, (2005)).
69
4.3.2 (How) Should Central Banks Signal Their Ignorance? 
The question of how a central bank should signal its own
uncertainty/ignorance to the public is one of the most important, and most
under-researched, questions in modern applied monetary economics. I shall
here only present some first, crude ideas. As always, there are benefits and
costs that have to be weighed against each other. 
On the one hand, by hiding its ignorance a central bank may give the
impression to the public that it knows more than it actually does. It can do this
by mainly arguing with forecasts based on econometric models when it
explains its monetary policy decisions. This procedure, however, is
two-edged. A central bank may well succeed (in the short run) in increasing
its image of competence (by creating the impression that its monetary policy
decisions are based on a mainly scientific basis): It may try to hide the fact
that econometric models do not fully reflect the information that has led to
a particular forecast or decision. Forecasts produced by the central bank are,
however, as we have argued above, based on both formal and informal
methods, and on inspection of many more variables than those entering into
the central bank’s econometric model. That is, the central bank may try to
conceal that there is a judgmental gap between model and predictions on the
one hand and policy decisions on the other (Pagan, (2003), p. 4). 
Giving this impression of being more “competent” than it actually is may be
advantageous for the central bank, at least in the short run. However,
concealing its own ignorance may also imply some risks: In particular, if
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68 On the obvious limitations of these quantitative indicators based on texts see, e.g., Cobham
(2003).
69As central bank documents are worded extremely carefully they appear to provide excellent
case material for discourse analysis.
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deviate from a simple rule to which it might have committed itself. This may
then not be easy to explain to the public without creating the danger of being
assessed as “discretionary” and “reneging”.
70
On the other hand, being fully transparent about its own ignorance, which
would include conceding that monetary policymakers use constant
adjustments, eyeballing and other rules of thumb, may irritate (some of) the
other participants in the financial markets and, perhaps most of all, the
general public. Whether, and how strongly, an irritation of this nature arises,
depends on history, i.e. depends upon the prior impression created by the
central bank. If the central bank has previously given the impression (i) of
being more competent than it actually is and (ii) of its decisions being
founded mainly on a scientific basis, then the irritation, and hence the loss of
credibility, may be high. This decline in the credibility or reputation of central
banks as competent authorities may also reduce their ability to steer the
monetary policy process, and, in extreme cases, may even destabilize the
economic development by creating bank runs, panics, etc. The greatest
danger, however, of shifting from low to high transparency about its own
ignorance may be for a central bank that it thereby exposes itself to the danger
of losing its independence if it is no longer regarded as being competent
enough by the general public. This would probably imply significant
macroeconomic costs.
71
To sum up, it is not easy for a central bank to move on this trade-off and find
its optimal point of transparency. The individually optimal point on this
trade-off for a single central banker is likely to be dependent upon its current
(ex-ante) level of reputation of competence, which is mainly dependent upon
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70 This is a general problem that would just be aggravated by discovering that there is
a judgmental gap hidden by the central bank. Mishkin ((2004), p. 11) notes that “[w]hen new
information comes in and the central bank changes the policy rate from its projected path, the
public may see this as reneging on its announced policy or an indication that the central
bank’s previous policy settings were a mistake. Thus, even when the central bank is conducting its
policy in an optimal manner, deviations from its projected path may be viewed as a central bank
failure and could hurt the central bank’s credibility.” Or in other words: “[C]entral banks need to
employ consistent modes of communication and language if they are to be well understood.
Abrupt changes in what is communicated, and how, always carry risks of confusion.” (Lomax,
(2005), p. 16).
71 Even widely publicized inflation reports may produce risks, or significant macroeconomic
costs, insofar as they may sensitize rational inattentive individuals to inflation, and this may lead
to wider fluctuations in inflationary expectations. In the presence of forward-looking elements in
price formation, this may worsen the policy trade-off between stabilization of inflation and of
output (Cukierman, (2005)).
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normal circumstances) to concede from the beginning that there are feasibility
constraints on transparency and transparent communication, as well as on
sticking to commitments to simple rules, against the background of potential
low-probability events that cannot be included adequately in simple rules of
this kind. By doing this, it may well lose some of its reputation of being
competent, but it will gain credibility. As/if the gain in credibility is more
long-term than the loss in reputation, honesty (and transparency) may prove
beneficial, at least for an institution (like the central bank) that is not (or,
should not be) too short-sighted.
72
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72 However, not only the degree of short-sightedness of the central bank is important here, but
also that of the public (and hence of the government) plays a role, since a perceived loss in
competence of the central bank may produce a call from the public (or the government) for
a reduction in the central bank’s independence. A reduction in the central bank’s independence,
however, would be associated with significant losses, not only for central bankers, but also
throughout the economy.
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This Study has argued, that, over the past decades, theory and practice of
monetary policy have changed significantly. In particular, monetary policy
economics has increased its focus on information and information
asymmetries between the monetary authorities and markets, as well as (more
recently) on uncertainty. As a result of this, the ineffectiveness theory of the
“new classical macroeconomics” (NCM) has lost support in the course of the
further development or synthesis of the NCM with new Keynesian
macroeconomics in the form of the “new neoclassical synthesis” (NNS), at
least for the short term. The foundation for this is the inclusion of micro based
nominal rigidities. If we then integrate uncertainty as well, in certain
circumstances the ineffectiveness theory is also questionable with regard to
the longer term as well. Adifference should be made here between traditional,
Bayesian uncertainty analysis and a Keynesian/post-Keynesian uncertainty
analysis. Recently, the latter has suddenly been taken seriously in the
mainstream as well, following years in which it was “ignored”. I have
introduced some example of this from the sphere of the theory of monetary
policy. At present, it is not at all clear where this development will lead in the
future and what implications this will have. Nonetheless, it appears that it will
become a highly interesting research field for the coming years that will be
worthwhile paying close attention to. Nor is it clear yet which consequences
this will have for optimal strategy, communication und institutional design of
central banks. At least, recent (still infant) research indicates that simple rules,
transparency and central banking by committees might be optimal
consequences from this. However, still a lot of further research is necessary
to get a clearer view on this.
This may lead some to argue for “sceptical eclecticism” instead of scientific
ambitions (in the form of single-minded devotion to any particular model) in
central banking (e.g., Laidler, (2007)). However, this should not lead to an
“anything goes” attitude. To build on advances in the theory of monetary
policy is important as the latter may function as a benchmark and point of
focus for practitioners even if they not slavishly could/should follow advices
derived from theory. Judgement matters, as a complementary component, and
that’s what makes central banking to an “art”.
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Annex A: Theoretical background on the compromise variant (on
sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.2) (with Daniel Schulz)
The theoretical concept of uncertainty can be implemented with different
mathematical concepts, as is shown in detail in Camerer and Weber (1992).
One possibility, which is taken up in sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.2, does not assume
any expected probabilities and instead permits unambiguous but, as
a generalization of a probability measurement, “non-additive probabilities”
(also known as “capacities”). Acapacity is a set function from the potential set
P(S) of a finite stochastic decision space S in the closed interval [0,1], which
allocates a weight between 0 and 1 to every event. For a capacity v only one
scaling property (v(∅) = 0 and v(S) = 1) and one monotonicity property applies,
so that v(A) ≤ v(B) for each pair A, B ∈ P(S) with A ⊂ B. With a standard
probability measure the monotonicity follows directly from the additive
property. A non-additive property means v(A ∪ B) ≠ v(A) + v(B) – v(A ∩ B).
Significant consequences of this are:
1. Two equivalently equal events have the same probability or capacity
(v(A) = v(B)), but they do not have to have the same capacity as two
events C and D that are also equivalently equal, but whose estimate is
based on more information.
2. v(A) and v(B) measure the probability of events as an implication of the
evidence, against which 1 – v(A) – v(B)measures the trust in the probabilities
as weighting of the evidence. With a probability measure the probability of
an event measures both dimensions of the evidence, which had already
surprised Keynes (Camerer and Weber, (1992), p. 327).
However, the use of capacities also involves difficulties, e.g. the maximizing
of u(x) no longer necessarily corresponds to the minimizing of –u(x). Other
problems can be found in Camerer and Weber ((1992), p. 351).
The integral above a capacity also has to be redefined. I want to refer here
only to the key term Choquet integral, which coincides with the Riemann
integral for a probability measure. The compromise shown above is
a consequence of this approach, in that the capacity through which the
Choquet integral is then calculated is derived from the belief function (that
represents the degree of uncertainty) of the decision makers.
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A simplified model structure with a two-period approach is shown below:
(B.1) Lt = 0.5πt
2 – b(yt – y
T)
(B.2) yt = c(πt – πt
e).
(B.1) is the standard loss function in inflation (π) and output (y). The optimal
inflation rate is set to zero here, y
T is the target level for output. The parameter
b indicates the importance of output relative to inflation stabilization. The
greater the parameter the more important is output stabilization. Rational
expectations are assumed.
(B.2) describes the aggregated supply function. It says that supply only
deviates from its equilibrium value as a result of inflation surprises (shocks
are abstracted from here). c is a positive constant. The expectation value of
the output is zero and is therefore less than the target value. 
There are two possible types of politicians, and private individuals do not
know beforehand which type is at present in office. Type 1 shares the
preferences of private individuals and attempts to minimize:
(B.3) L = L1 + δL2.
The parameter δ expresses the relevance of the second period in social
welfare. In contrast, type 2 is not concerned with the output target and
therefore sets the rate of inflation at zero in period 1 and period 2. (It is
assumed that it can do this as well.) Even if it is not certain which politician
is in office, the corresponding probabilities are known. With probability z it
is the politician of type 1, and with probability (1 – z) the one of type 2.
How does the type 1 politician now behave? The inflation expectations are
given for him and he therefore minimises L2 over π2:
(B.4) .
He therefore selects in any case the discretionary rate π = cb in the second
period. In the first period, however, he will take into account the effect that
his selected rate of inflation has on the inflation expectations, and possibly set
π = 0. This is done so that the private individuals do not know in period 2
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zero and still do not know which politician is in office. However, if
a politician selects a rate of inflation greater than zero, the private individuals
will adjust their expectations, because they now know with certainty that type
1 is in office, and expect the discretionary rate of inflation for period 2
(private individuals adjust their expectations because of the observed rate of
inflation, in order words, they learn). In the first period, if he deviates, type 1
will select the discretionary rate of inflation, so that the following value
results for the loss function:
(B.5)
The alternative for type 1 consists of “hiding” behind type 2 and setting the
rate of inflation at zero. It can be shown that, circumstances permitting he
“randomizes” in the equilibrium between cb and zero, i.e. he chooses between
both in accordance with the random principle. Let q be the probability with
which the type 1 politician selects π1 = 0. The inflation expectation of private
individuals for π2 can be calculated from this. This is done through Bayesian
updating. If private individuals now observe π1 = 0, this can mean either that
type 2 is in office, which is the case with a probability of (1 – z), or that the
type 1 politician is in office but is behaving strategically, which happens with
probability zq. The probability that type 1 is in office according to this is 
and this results as well in the inflation expectations of private
individuals, if they observe π1 = 0:
(B.6)
The value of the loss function can now be easily calculated:
(B.7)
As can be seen from the third term, Lπ1=0 increases with q. This lies in the
higher inflation expectations as a result of a high value of q.
Annex 67
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(*) Lπ1=0(0) > Lπ1=cb
(**) Lπ1=0(1) < Lπ1=cb
(***) Lπ1=0(0) < Lπ1=cb< Lπ1=0(1).
On (*):
In this case, the loss that the politician realizes if he selects an inflation rate
of zero is in any case greater than if he reveals himself immediately to be
a type 1 politician and selects the discretionary rate. He will, therefore, always
select the discretionary rate in the first period. The reason for this lies in
a very low discount factor δ. This means that, if the weight of the second
period is sufficiently low, he will in all cases reveal himself. The condition for
this is that δ < 0.5 [cf. (B.5) and (B.7)].
On (**):
It is now not worthwhile in any case for type 1 to reveal himself. Even if
private individuals cannot draw any further conclusions regarding the type
that is in office from an inflation rate of zero, it is still logical to set π1 = 0.
This case occurs if the politician includes the loss in period 2 to a sufficient
extent in his calculation. Expressed mathematically this means that
δ > 0.5(1 – z)
–1 [cf. again (B.5) and (B.7)].
On (***):
From the conditions derived under (*) and (**) it follows that this possibility
occurs if 0.5 < δ < 0.5(1 – z)
–1. If the private individuals expect the politician
to select π1 = 0 [=Lπ1=0 (1)], he will select the discretionary rate, and if they
expect him to select a positive inflation rate [=Lπ1=0 (0)] he will set π1 = 0.
Consequently, the economy can only be in equilibrium if he sometimes
selects π1 = cb and sometimes π1 = 0. This corresponds to the randomizing
referred to above. The probability q must be adjusted so that the politician is
indifferent between positive and zero inflation. This probability is calculated
by making (B.5) and (B.7) equal. If this is solved after q, the following results
as equilibrium condition:
(B.8)
It can be seen that the probability that type 1 realizes zero inflation is greater
the more the second period (increase in δ) is taken into account.
It can be shown from the above reputation model that the influence of
reputation considerations is greater if the difference between the preferred
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if there is greater uncertainty regarding the type of politician (i.e. if z is closer
to 0.5). Without providing detailed evidence of this here I will simply give
some explanatory reasons. The theory that the influence on inflation is greater
if there is greater uncertainty regarding the characteristics of politicians can
be established as follows. Let us assume for the sake of simplicity that δ is
one. Let us further assume that the politician type can be publicly observed.
Type 1 would then always set π1 = cb and type 2 would always set π1 = 0. In
contrast, with incomplete information on the type of politician type 1 sets
π1 =0   with a probability of q. The uncertainty therefore reduces the average
inflation of the first period by zqcb. With δ = 1 the condition for (**), namely
δ > 0.5(1 – z)
–1, implies that q = 1 if z < 0.5. For this value of z the reduction
in the average inflation in the first period is therefore zcb. In contrast, (B.8)
implies that q = (1 – z)/z if z > 0.5. This means that for these values of z the
reduction in the average rate of inflation in the first period is equal to
(1 – z)cb. The maximal reduction therefore arises at z = 0.5 and is 0.5cb.
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Annex C: Robust control (with Daniel Schulz)
The original modelling of the robust control decision problem is also called
a “robust Stackelberg problem”. The political decision maker has the
position of the (independent) Stackelberg leader and the households, modelled
as representative agents, have the position of the Stackelberg followers, who
are dependent on the leader. We will discuss the leader’s decision problem
first.
Generally M(m×n;R) is the set of matrices with m lines and n columns.
According to this definition a vector is an element of the set M(m×1;R). Let
zt∈M(nz×1;R) be the vector of the leader’s natural state variables that
describes the state of nature at time t and is determined by the past. Let
xt∈M(nx× 1;R) be the vector of the model’s endogenous variables that are
able to change at time t. These variables include, e.g., prices and quantities
that clear the markets at time t. For the sake of clarity the two vectors will be
combined into one vector  Let Ut∈M(nU×1;R)
be the vector of the leader’s control variables.
Annex 69
73 For the more general case δ > 1/2 it can be shown that the maximum influence of reputation
considerations occurs if z = (2δ – 1)/2δ, and is equal to [(2δ – 1)/2δ]cb. There is no influence with
δ < 0.5.
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(C.1) r(y, U): = y´Qy + U´RU
with the well-defined symmetric matrices Q ∈ M((nz + nx)×(nz + nx);R) and
R ∈ M(nU ×nU;R).
The inter-temporal maximising problem of the Stackelberg leader is then
(C.2) .
Find a law of motion for the solution of the vector yt. Every kind of policy is
evaluated taking into account a set of models that are indexed by a vector of
specification errors Wt+1around its approximating model.
Basically, it is necessary to distinguish between two cases:
1. The error of the approximating model is constructed by a nonlinear,
dynamic and normally distributed probability process.
2. For the proceeding analysis only the non-linear part of the error is
modelled.
In the first case, Wt+1 consists of two additive parts. The first part is
a normally distributed probability process εt+1, with expectation 0 and I as
covariance matrix, the elements of which are i.i.d. This process can only
explain a small part of the approximation errors. In particular it does not
describe any dynamic misspecification errors, such as a non-linear and
time-dependent reaction to past representations of y
t. The challenge of the
second part of the sum (call it wt+1) is to cover these misspecification errors.
Let gt be a sequence of measurable functions. The vector process wt+1is then
expressed by wt+1 =g t (yt,y t–1,...), which may indicate a non-linear past
dependency of yt. Write therefore Wt+1 = εt+1 +w t+1. The vectors xt and yt
need to be written with the expectation operator as Etxt and Etyt.
The second case consists of Wt+1 =w t+1 only, and the expectation operator
does not have to be used anymore. The decision rules that will be estimated
in the proceedings of this section are independent of the use of εt and therefore
it will not be quoted anymore. Now formulate a transition law to connect the
movements of the natural state variables with the control variables:
(C.3) .
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(C.4)
(C.5) ⇔ yt+1= Ayt + BUt + CWt+1.
The equations for the follower are similar to the three equations estimated for
the leader. The equations that represent the behaviour of the follower contain
the first order conditions (Euler equations) of the households’ optimisation
problem. The Euler equations express the forward-looking character of the
follower’s behaviour.
Wt+1 is unknown for the two players at time t because they do not have
knowledge of wt+1. They are only informed of an  –distributed 
probability process ˘ εt with i.i.d. members of the sequence. ˘ εt ≠ε t is possible.
The players by assumption recognise their approximating model as a good
model in the following sense: The approximation errors are limited by the
constraint
(C.6)
with η0 > 0 small. For the interpretation and discussion of η see Hansen and
Sargent ((2006), pp. 8–11).
The leader, suspecting her approximating model, wants to make good
decisions over a set of models (5) with respect to (6). These kinds of decisions
are called robust against misspecification of the model.
Hansen and Sargent (2003) state for η0 > 0 the maximisation of (2) with
respect to (5) as constrained Stackelberg problem. It consists in finding
a sequence of decision rules (containing Ut and Wt+1) as a sequence of
functions with respect to the past of z
t for the decision in time t. The leader
chooses one rule in time 0 and keeps on following it.
Call this rule for Ut with η0 > 0 a robust Stackelberg plan or robust Ramsey
plan.
Let us now take a look at the idea of the explicit solution. To reach this goal,
solving a multiplier game is better than using a constrained game
74. For this, we
will add a Lagrange multiplier Θ to constraint (6) and express the constrained
game as a Lagrange game.
Annex 71
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zero-sum game for two players
(C.7)
with respect to (5) and Θ _ < Θ < ∞.




* = Ay + Bu + CW
y
* is the state vector of the next period. The long-run problem is now
transformed into several problems of one period.
The Bellman equation now has to be translated into a Riccati equation. Using
stability properties of a shadow price from the Bellman equation and
transforming the multipliers in the state variables will lead to the formulation of
the Stackelberg plan. For more details see Hansen and Sargent ((2003), pp. 10f).
A similar decision rule exists for the Stackelberg follower. To construct this
use θ (probably not equal to Θ) and the Bellman-Isaac conditions. The latter
are needed to reach a sub-game perfect equilibrium from the solution of the
Euler equations. Without the Bellman-Isaac conditions, a Markov-perfect
equilibrium, calculated from the Euler equations, will not be sub-game
perfect in a general 2 player game.
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